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A b s t r a c t
Criminal Wives in the Old Bailey: Crime and Coverture in Eighteenth-Century London
By Marisha Caswell
Abstract: Under coverture husband and wife were one person before the law. Part of 
coverture was the presumption of coercion, which held that married women who 
committed crimes did so under the direction of their husbands, and were therefore not 
liable for their actions. Because of this presumption, criminal historians have discounted 
the actions of married women accused of crime and thereby supported the eighteenth- 
century assertion that married women were the favourites of the law. However, studies 
of property and women’s rights often argue that coverture was a patriarchal tool designed 
to maintain married women’s subordination. Using the records of the Old Bailey, 
London’s central criminal court, this study seeks to account for the actions of married 
women accused of crime in the eighteenth century. The seemingly irreconcilable views 
o f modem feminists and eighteenth-century legal commentators are reconciled and 
married women are given a place in eighteenth-century criminal history.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n : M a r r ia g e , C r im e , C o v e r t u r e  a n d  C o e r c io n
When a small brooke or little river incorporateth with Rhodanus,
Humber, or the Thames, the poore Rivolet looseth her name, it is 
carried and recarried with the new associate, it beareth no sway, 
it possesseth nothing during coverture. A woman as soone as she 
is married is called covert. . . that is, vailed, as it were, clouded 
and overshadowed, she hath lost her stream.
-T.E. The Lawes Resolutions o f  Womens Rights, 1632
In 1700, John and Elizabeth Handley appeared before the Old Bailey. They had 
lodged at Stephen Rowse’s lodging house, and when Rowse awakened the next morning, 
he found the Handleys gone, his mattress filled with dirt and some contents of the room 
missing. In the middle o f the night, the Handleys had cut open the feather mattress and 
stolen its contents along with a number o f other items. Rowse prosecuted the Handleys 
for stealing feathers, pewter plates and an iron candlestick. At trial, “The fact was plainly 
prov’d against them, the jury therupon found the man guilty and acquitted the woman, 
she doing it in obedience to her husband’s commands.” 1 The jurors obviously believed 
that Elizabeth had committed the theft, so why did they acquit her? The answer lies in 
the complicated common law doctrine of coverture. This doctrine assumed that upon 
marriage, a husband and wife became one person before the law. The married couple 
took on the identity of the husband as his was the more powerful personality. Since a 
married woman did not have an independent legal identity she could not own property, 
sue or be sued without her husband, make contracts, and in certain cases she was not 
liable for her debts or criminal actions. Coverture was a complex system of benefits and 
drawbacks that depended on individual circumstances and interpretations. Elizabeth 
Handley obviously benefited from coverture, but was her case the norm or was it an
1 “John Handley, Elizabeth Handley, Theft: Simple Grand Larceny, 15th January, 1700,” The Proceedings 
o f  the O ld  Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1700s/t 17000115-1 l.html> 2005.
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exception to the practices of eighteenth-century London juries? The defence of coercion 
illustrates that coverture had some benefits, but in practice these benefits were legal 
fictions designed to deprive women of certain rights while maintaining their submission 
to the patriarchal order.
A married woman who committed a crime in the presence of her husband could 
claim the defence o f coercion, and the jury could acquit her of her actions since she did 
them under her husband’s command.2 Judges and juries often assumed a wife’s 
obedience only when the husband was present. A husband’s absence during a crime 
would often remove the presumption of coercion. Eighteenth-century legal 
commentators and conduct writers pointed to this aspect of coverture as one o f the 
reasons why women were the favourites o f the English law.3 However, modem 
scholarship has tended to portray coverture as harmful to women: a legal fiction that 
maintained women’s subordinate position. This thesis will show that these two 
seemingly irreconcilable views actually reflect the multiple purposes and aspects of 
coverture. While married women accused o f crime, such as Elizabeth Handley, could, in 
theory, benefit from coverture, practice actually limited its application. An examination 
o f the eighteenth-century Old Bailey cases reveals that only women who conformed to 
the ideal gender order actually received the benefit of presumed coercion. If a married 
woman showed independent action or acted outside the proper feminine roles, juries did 
not feel that she deserved the defence of coercion. In this sense, the defence o f coercion
2 Law quibbles. Or, a treatise o f  the evasions, tricks, turns and quibbles commonly used in the profession  
o f  the law  (London, 1724); Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f  England, Book I 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), 432; Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and  
the Obligations o f  Citizenship  (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 29.
3 Blackstone, Commentaries /, 433; Baron and Feme: A Treatise o f  the Common Law Concerning 
Husbands and Wives (London, 1700), 4. This point is discussed further in the next chapter.
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was limited favouritism. Rather than benefiting all married women, it actually served to 
reinforce the gender order by favouring those who conformed and punishing those who 
did not.
One of the main problems with understanding coverture and how it worked lies in 
the lack of communication between different areas of historical study. Most historians 
who study coverture focus on its implications in regards to property.4 While coverture 
related primarily to property, it had effects in other branches of the law. By focusing on 
property, historians have largely ignored coverture’s function in the criminal law. 
Historians of the criminal law face an even larger division as gender and especially 
female crime is largely ignored. It was not until recently that women have started to gain 
any more than a cursory reference in works of overall criminality in eighteenth-century 
England.5 These works note that women accounted for a small proportion o f overall 
criminality, often lower than 20 percent. Studies of female criminality have sought to 
explain this difference rather than examine female crime on its own terms.6 In addition, 
these studies focus largely on single or widowed women accused of crimes and rarely 
mention married women. Because of the defence of coercion, historians have tended to 
argue that married women were not responsible for their actions and therefore leave
4 Since coverture is a complicated doctrine, and its understanding is central to this thesis, a more indepth 
discussion o f  historiographical debates about the purpose and working o f  coverture is provided in the next 
chapter.
5 Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: The 
Penquin Press, 1991); Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,” in A lb ion ’s Fatal Tree, 
ed., Douglas Hay, et al. (London, 1975), 17-63; J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800  
(Princeton: Princton University Press, 1986); J.A. Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England 1550-1750, 
Second Edition (Essex: Addison W esley Longman Limited, 1999). While Beattie and Sharpe mention 
women in their analyses, women make up a very small proportion o f  their discussions o f  criminal 
behaviour.
6 J.M. Beattie, “The Criminality o f  Women in Eighteenth-Century England,” Journal o f  Social H istory 8 
(1975); Carol Z. Wiener, “Sex-Roles and Crime in Late Elizabethan Hertfordshire,” Journal o f  Social 
H istory 8 (1975); Peter Lawson, “Patriarchy, Crime and the Courts: The Criminality o f  Women in Late 
Tudor and Early Stuart England,” in Criminal Justice in the O ld World and the New: Essays in honour o f  
J.M. Beattie, ed. Greg Smith, et al. (Toronto, 1988).
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married women who committed or were accused of committing crimes out of the 
historical analyses.7 The problem with this lack of communication is that it misses 
important areas o f research. Coverture played a role in the criminal law, and by 
accepting the application of coercion without question, historians fail to fully understand 
its workings. Married women did commit crimes and were accused of commiting crimes, 
albeit fewer crimes than their single or widowed counterparts, and the defence of 
coercion did exist, but this does not mean that their actions were unimportant or that the 
courts did not treat them as criminals. It is only by bringing together the different 
historiographical arguments that one can properly understand the criminal actions of 
married women in the eighteenth century.
Issues o f Order and Control 
The eighteenth-century criminal law was especially harsh. As Donald Rumbelow 
explains, “In the seventy years between 1690 and 1760 the number of capital indictments 
written down in law rose from under eighty to over three hundred and fifty. There was 
literally nothing for which a man could not be hanged.”8 The chief example o f this was 
the 1723 Waltham Black Act, which made two hundred to two hundred and fifty offences 
capital offences, and was “so loosely drafted that it became a spawning ground for ever- 
extending legal judgements.”9 However, despite the harsh criminal code and the 
increasing number o f offences classified as capital offences, the execution rate remained 
relatively stable. This did not indicate an inefficient legal system, but rather illustrated
7 See the above sources and Peter King, “Female offenders: work and life-cycle changes in late eighteenth- 
century London,” Continuity and Change 11:1 (1996), 69; Robert B. Shoemaker, Gender in English 
Society 1650-1850: The Emergence o f  Separate Spheres?  (Essex: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 
1998), 297.
8 Donald Rumbelow, The Triple Tree: Newgate, Tyburn and O ld  Bailey (London: Harrap Limited, 1982), 
8 8 .
9 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin o f  the Black Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 23.
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the efforts of prosecutors, judges, juries, and authorities to limit the severity o f the law.10
Individual victims rather than the state chose what offences to prosecute. Private
prosecution was central to English justice in the eighteenth century. As Allyson May
notes, it meant that:
Offenders who were apprehended might never be tried let alone 
executed . .  . [and] even if a legal prosecution did ensue there were 
various ways in which the execution o f an offender could be avoided: 
the exercise o f discretion was available at virtually every stage of 
criminal proceedings.11
Discretion came in many forms and limited the severity of the letter o f the law. Even if
an individual chose to prosecute, the jury could acquit the defendant, or the jury could
undervalue the goods stolen so that the crime did not attract the death penalty, the judge
could direct the jury not to convict, the offender could plead benefit o f clergy, or the king
could exercise his mercy and pardon the offender. The functioning o f discretion meant
that despite the increasingly harsh criminal code, the number of executions in England
remained relatively stable and never matched the severity of the law.
Part of the reason why the execution rate did not have to match the severity of the
law was that the purpose o f the law was not to punish every offender. Rather, as John
Langbein argues, the central purpose o f the criminal trial was “to winnow down the
• « • • 19 • • •number of applications of the capital sanction.” Since execution was the primary 
punishment, it was important to choose offenders carefully to uphold the law and avoid 
upsetting the careful balance of mercy and terror inherent in the law. The public aspect
10 As Cynthia Herrup notes, the court agenda was the “end o f  an elaborate selection process rather than . . . 
the bumbling product o f  a weak and inadequate bureaucratic structure.” Cynthia B. Herrup, “Law and 
Morality in Seventeenth-Century England,” Past and Present 106 (1985), 103.
11 Allyson N. May, The Bar and the O ld  Bailey, 1750-1850  (Chapel Hill: The University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 2003), 13, emphasis added.
12 John Langbein, The Origins o f  Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 231, 
6, 336, 338, 343. This stood in stark contrast to the “truth-finding” inquisitorial legal system on the 
Continent.
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of punishment reinforced the terror o f the law and emphasised the key element of 
punishment, which was deterrence rather than punishing every offender.13 Authorities 
sought to make an example of those convicted in order to deter others from committing 
the same offence.14 Public execution was also a chance for the state to show its power to 
the ordinary people. As Peter Linebaugh argues, “hanging was one of the few occasions 
(coronations were another) that united the several parts of government.” This public 
display reinforced the power o f the law and “renewed the power o f sovereignty” while 
repeating “the lesson: ‘Respect Private Property’” and the rule of law.15 While ordinary 
people controlled aspects of the “Tyburn Procession”, where the condemned made his or 
her way from Newgate to the place of execution at Tyburn, execution was still an 
example o f state power. As V.A.C. Gatrell points out, despite the crowd’s actions, the 
convicted still hanged, which ultimately reinforced the power o f eighteenth-century 
authorities.16
In addition to noting the discretionary nature of the law, it is also important to 
understand why the system was discretionary. In his extremely influential essay, 
“Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,” (1975) Douglas Hay argues that “The 
criminal law was critically important in maintaining bonds o f obedience and deference, in 
legitimizing the status quo, in constantly recreating the structure of authority which arose
13 Simon Devereaux, “In Place o f  Death: Transportation, Penal Practices, and the English State, 1770- 
1830,” in Qualities o f  Mercy, ed. Carolyn Strange (Vancouver, 1996), 52-54.
14 As John Rule argues, “The landed rulers o f  England did not need  to hang all those indicted for felony; 
the assumption was o f  exemplary rather than retributive punishment.” John Rule, Albion's People: English 
Society 1714-1815 (Essex: Longman Group United Kingdom Limited, 1992), 237.
15 Linebaugh, The London Hanged, xx.
16 V.A.C. Gattrell, The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 91-99. Douglas Hay notes that ultimately the life and death decisions rested with 
the authorities rather than with the common people, despite the occasional examples o f  equal treatment 
before the law. Douglas Hay, “Prosecution and Power: Malicious Prosecution in the English Courts, 1750- 
1850,” in Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder, eds., Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 393-394. See also: Susan Dwyer Amussen, “Punishment, Discipline, and Power: 
The Social Meanings o f  Violence in Early Modem England,” Journal o f  British Studies 34 (1995), 9-10.
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from property and in turn protected its interests.”17 The criminal law was a potent tool of
the elite, who used it to maintain the social hierarchy and hegemony o f the landed class
while protecting private property in the absence o f a professional police force and 
1 8standing army. Instead of a professional police force, the elite relied on “legal 
instruments” to enforce “the division of property by terror,” which ultimately maintained 
the social hierarchy.19 John Langbein disagrees with Hay’s thesis that the law was an elite 
tool. Instead, Langbein argues that the “criminal law and its procedures existed to serve 
and protect the interest of the people who suffered as victims of crime, people who were
90overwhelmingly non-elite.” Both Langbein and Peter King correctly demonstrate that 
ordinary people used the law to their own advantage, which they argue goes against 
Hay’s theory. However, the strength of the criminal law was not the authority that it gave 
the elites, but rather the legitimacy it enjoyed amongst all the people of England. Hay 
does not argue that ordinary people did not use the law. In fact, Hay argues that the law 
replaced religion and “became a power with its own claims, higher than those of
91prosecutor, lawyers, and even the great scarlet-robed assize judge himself.” The law 
both maintained the authority of those in power and restrained them. The rule o f law was 
not absolute. As Christopher Brooks explains, “the rule o f law prevented social and 
political chaos and protected the persons and property o f the subjects from arbitrary
17 Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,” 25.
18 Hay, “Prosecution and Power,” 392.
19 Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,” 21.
20 John Langbein, “A lb ion ’s Fatal Flaws,” Past and Present 98 (1983), 97.
21 Hay, “Property,” 33. See also: Hay, “Prosecution and Power,” 344-345, 394-395; Douglas Hay and
Francis Snyder, “Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850: Policing, Private Prosecution, and the State,” in
Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850, ed. Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 4, 16, 47.
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99power.” The law gained legitimacy from its examples o f equal treatment and from 
ordinary people using the law for their own purposes.23 Rather than simply being a tool 
of the elite, the law was a ‘“ multiple-use right’ which accommodated complaints from, 
and depended upon the participation of, members of all social classes with the exception 
of the poor.”24 The law existed to maintain the status quo. This meant that authorities 
had to play by certain rules if  they expected to remain in power. However, the status quo 
also meant that the law reinforced the existing social hierarchy. The law was one o f the 
strongest elements o f social control because the people accepted its control as natural and 
as part of their rights as Englishmen and women.
In his critique of “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,” Peter King argues 
that although Hay’s “gentry-centred analysis enables us to answer specific questions,. . .
• • • 9 Sit leaves other important themes unexplored or partially represented.” While King and 
Langbein are correct in pointing out the importance of individual prosecutors, they, along 
with Hay miss another important aspect of social control inherent in the criminal law.
The social order was undoubtedly important, but there was more than one hierarchy to 
maintain in eighteenth-century England. Eighteenth-century people viewed gender as a 
hierarchical relationship rather than separate spheres26 One o f the purposes of the law
22 Christopher Brooks, “Professions, Ideology and the Middling Sort in the late Sixteenth and Early 
Seventeenth Centuries,” in Jonathan Barry and Christopher Brooks, eds., The M iddling Sort o f  People: 
Culture, Society and Politics in England, 1550-1800  (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 125.
23 The execution o f  Lawrence Shirley, Lord Ferrers on May 5, 1760 for the murder o f  his steward clearly 
demonstrated the “equality” o f  the law. Gattrell, Hanging Tree, 245-246; Hay, “Property, Authority and 
Criminal Law,” 33-35.
24 Robert B. Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment: Petty crime and the law in London and rural 
Middlesex, c. 1660-1725  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 4.
25 Peter King, “Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the English Criminal Law,” The Historical 
Journal 27:1 (1984), 58.
26 Anna Clark, The Struggle fo r  the Breeches: Gender and the Making o f  the British Working Class 
(Berkely and Los Angeles: University o f  California Press, 1995), 2; John Bohstedt, “Gender, Household 
and Community Politics: Women in English Riots 1790-1810,” Past and Present 120 (1988), 97. People
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was to maintain this gender hierarchy, which included the subordinate position of women 
and the authority o f men over women. The way to do this was to ensure that women 
fulfilled their proper gender roles and behaved as ideal women should.27
Ideal women were, above all, obedient.28 George Savile, Marquis o f Halifax, 
explained to his daughter in 1688 that “Men who were to be the Lawgivers, had the larger 
share of Reason bestowed upon them; by which means your Sex is the better prepar’d for 
the Compliance that is necessary for the better performance o f those Duties which seem 
to be most properly assigned to it.”29 A woman had a duty to obey most men, especially 
her husband. As William Perkins explained, marriage combined two people into one, 
“and of these two, the one is always higher and beareth the rule, the other is lower and 
yieldeth subjection.” While it was possible for a woman to be the dominant personality 
in marriage, conduct writers and most members of society felt strongly that a husband
o i
was superior to his wife. In order to maintain this situation, conduct books gave 
married women advice such as; “the duties of a wife to her husband in every degree and 
state of life, can be no less than fidelity, and obedience to all his lawful desires and
saw women as naturally weaker than men, which doomed them to an inferior status. Robert H. Michel, 
“English Attitudes Towards Women, 1640-1740,” Canadian Journal o f  H istory 13:1 (1978), 39.
27 Sara Mendelson and Patricia Crawford, Women in Early Modern England, 1550-1700  (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), 33.
28 As Vivien Jones explains ‘“ natural femininity . .  . offered an illusion o f  power based on sublimation and 
passive virtue.” Vivien Jones, ed., Women in the Eighteenth Century: Constructions o f  Femininity (London 
and N ew  York: Routledge, 1990), 15.
29 George Savile, Marquis o f  Halifax, “The Lady’s N ew Year’s Gift: or Advice to a Daughter, (1688),” in 
Women in the Eighteenth Century: Constructions o f  Femininity, ed. Vivien Jones (London and N ew  York: 
Routledge, 1990), 18. Emphasis in original.
30 William Perkins, “Christian Economy: or, A Short Survey o f  the Right Manners o f  Erecting and 
Ordering a Family According to the Scriptures (1609),” in Daughters, Wives and Widows: Writings by Men 
about Women and M arriage in England, 1500-1640, ed. Joan Larsen Klein (Urbana and Chicago: 
University o f  Illinois Press, 1992), 157.
31 As Anthony Fletcher argues, literature and conduct advice was written by men and “tell us how men 
wanted women to see the gender order, their place in it and themselves. They tell us what women heard, 
saw, read or were taught. But they tell us nothing o f  what they thought.” Anthony Fletcher, Gender, Sex 
and Subordination in England, 1500-1800  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), xxi.
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T9prudent counsels.” A wife was not supposed to question the authority o f her husband 
who was, in a domestic setting, the “very image of almighty God, the father o f all 
things.” In 1722, William Fleetwood explained that it was part o f the curse o f Eve that 
a woman obeyed her husband no matter how “unreasonable and extravagant. . .  his 
Desire shall.. .  appear.”34 In order to maintain the subordinate position of women, the 
law and those in power, including husbands, demanded obedience from their inferiors 
and dependants. As Anthony Fletcher explains, obedience was important since “women 
were credited with an inner weakness that could all to easily lead them through the 
assertion of their sexual and emotional power to defy the patriarchal order and break its 
boundaries.”35 Therefore, authorities enforced obedience through paternalistic doctrines 
and conventions such as coverture and the defence of coercion. Obedient wives 
conformed to the prevailing gender ideology and could receive “benefits” inherent to 
their station. However, such protection was unavailable to disobedient wives. In this 
sense, the defence of coercion actually reinforced the subordinate status o f married 
women by rewarding obedience and punishing disobedience. The fear o f married women 
destroying the gender order created coverture’s system of rewards for obedience and 
punishments for disobedience.
32 Wetenhall Wilkes, “A Letter o f  Genteel and Moral Advice to a Young Lady, (8th edition 1766),” in 
Women in the Eighteenth Century: Constructions o f  Femininity, ed. Vivien Jones (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 35.
33 Juan Luis Vives, transl. Richard Hyde, “A Very Fruitful and Pleasant Book Called the Instruction o f  a 
Christian Woman, (translation 1523,” in Daughters, Wives and Widows: Writings by Men about Women 
and M arriage in England, 1500-1640, ed. Joan Larsen Klein (Urbana and Chicago: University o f  Illinois 
Press, 1992), 110.
34 William Fleetwood, The relative duties o f  parents and children, husbands and wives, masters and  
servants, Third Edition (London, 1722), 138. See also: William Kenrick, The Whole D uty o f  a Woman, 
Fourth Edition (London, 1764), 75.
35 Fletcher, Gender, 24, 12.
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While obedience was one of the principal duties of women, married or not, other 
qualities and standards existed. Keith Thomas explains that women were not only 
expected to behave with sobriety, but also to be modest, delicate, bashful, and silent as 
well as possessing all the other “feminine virtues.”36 In 1744 John Gregory argued that, 
“One of the chief beauties in a female character, is that modest reserve, that retiring 
delicacy, which avoids the public eye, and is disconcerted even at the gaze of 
admiration.”37 Women were meant to avoid the spotlight and not draw attention to 
themselves through either their actions or their words.38 “Humility, sobriety, modesty of 
deportment, an industrious disposition, [and] an adjustment o f [her] manners to [her] 
circumstances” characterized the ideal woman.39 In theory and in conduct books, women 
were passive dependants who were not supposed to take independent initiative, nor were 
they expected to rule any except their own dependants.40 The ideal woman was passive, 
modest, obedient, chaste, sober, and did not question authority of any sort. Despite their 
limited implementation in practice, these ideals still existed and carried force especially 
in the decisions o f judges and juries, who used the law to uphold this particular gender 
order.41
36 Keith Thomas, “The Double Standard,” Journal o f  the H istory o f  Ideas 20:2 (1959), 214.
37 John Gregory, “A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters, (1744),” in Women in the Eighteenth Century: 
Constructions o f  Femininity, ed. Vivien Jones (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1990), 45.
38 Michele Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity: national identity and language in the eighteenth century 
(London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1996), 65.
39 Priscilla Wakefield, “Reflections on the Present Condition o f  the Female Sex; with suggestions for its 
Improvement (1798),” in Women in the Eighteenth Century: Constructions o f  Femininity, ed. Vivien Jones 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 127.
40 Martin Ingram argues that despite such strictures, strong, active wives were prized, and that the 
contradictions between patriarchal prescriptions and daily realities often led to charivaris and 
skimmingtons. Martin Ingram, “Ridings, Rough Music and the ‘Reform o f  Popular Culture’ in Early 
Modem England,” Past and Present 105 (1984), 97-98, 112-113.
41 As Mendelson and Crawford explain, the discretion within the law, put “pressure on women to represent 
themselves as dependent, subordinate and not responsible.” Mendelson and Crawford, Women, 47. See 
also: Candace Kruttschnitt, “Women, Crime and Dependency - An Application o f  the Theory o f  Law,”
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As Amy Louise Erickson argues, “Despite the fact that women exercised 
considerably more power over property than has previously been allowed, both the legal 
system and individual men still kept women firmly subordinate.”42 Even if a woman 
managed to act independently or work within the system, she was still subject to laws 
which men wrote and which were enforced in courts staffed by men.43 It was men, not 
individual women, who ultimately held the authority of the law and these men sought to 
maintain the subordinate position o f women. Despite the emphasis criminal history 
places on upholding the social order and the obvious connection between the social and 
gender hierarchy, studies of women’s crime do not generally focus on the gender order. 
Rather, historians who study women’s crime seek to explain why women accounted for 
less overall criminality than men. Crime in and of itself requires a certain amount of 
initiative. Because o f this initiative and the association of females with passive 
behaviour, the low numbers of female criminals has led historians and sociologists alike 
to argue that crime is a typically masculine trait.44 As Carol Z. Wiener explains, “the 
greater readiness o f men to violate the economic statutes in the first place may have 
resulted from their more assertive personalities as well as their greater need.”45 Wiener 
describes female criminals as less daring than male criminals were. They committed the 
types o f crimes that did not require much bravado or initiative, such as receiving stolen
Criminology 19:4 (1982), 498, 510, for a more modem example o f  jury behaviour towards dependant 
women.
42 Amy Louise Erickson, Women and Property in Early Modern England  (London: Routledge, 1995), 19.
43 Ibid, 18; The Lawes Resolution o f  Womens Rights (London, 1632), 2.
44 Mary Chesney-Lind, “Women and Crime: The Female Offender,” Signs 12:1 (1986), 87-88; Ngaire 
Naffine, Female Crime.The Construction o f  Women in Criminology (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 43- 
44, 60, 62; Darrell Steffensmeier and Emilie Allan, “Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory o f  
Female Offending,” Annual Review o f  Sociology  22 (196), 4 7 0 ,4 7 4 ,4 7 6 ; Otto Poliak, The Criminality o f  
Women (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, Incorporated, 1961), xv; Olwen Hufton, “Women in 
History: Early Modem Europe,” Past and Present 101 (1983), 139.
45 Carol Z. Wiener, “Sex-Roles and Crime in Late Elizabethan Hertfordshire,” Journal o f  Social H istory 8 
(1975), 43.
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goods or acted as accessories to male crime. In short, women took what was readily 
available to them and left entrepreneurial theft to men.46 Arguing along the same line, 
John Beattie explains that women committed fewer crimes because o f their socialization 
into dependant and passive roles.47 These roles were part o f the gender order; however, 
neither Beattie nor Wiener accounted for the role of the law in maintaining the gender 
order. Their focus was rather on characterizing women as passive in their behaviour 
because of the passive roles they occupied in society. According to Beattie and Wiener, 
crime and the law was a reflection of, rather than the maintenance of the gender order.
Although women were accused of fewer crimes than men in the eighteenth 
century, they still committed and were accused o f committing crimes. In contrast to the 
more traditional studies, Garthine Walker and Jenny Kermode point out that measuring 
female criminality against male criminality marginalizes women’s actions and “neglect[s]
4 8the dynamics of human interaction [while denying] agency to historical actors.” 
Representing female criminals as abnormal, relatively passive and insignificant leaves 
out important aspects of the history o f crime. In addition, comparing the actions o f men 
and women ensures that men are the norm and female criminals are unusual and not 
representative of either females or criminals. As Lynn MacKay argues, “female thieves 
were not simply paler reflections o f the male norm.”49 Rather, female criminals should 
be studied in their own right, not as a subset o f male criminality. As Walker explains, the 
association o f criminality with men has meant that “the concepts and methodologies of
46 Ibid , 42-43.
47 Beattie, “The Criminality o f  Women,” 89, 96 ,98 .
48 Garthine Walker and Jenny Kermode, “Introduction,” in Jenny Kermode and Garthine Walker, eds., 
Women, Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 
1994), 4. See also: Garthine Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.
49 Lynn MacKay, “Why They Stole: Women in the Old Bailey, 1779-1789,” Journal o f  Social H istory 32:3 
(1999), 633.
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historians have been biased accordingly. They have rarely been concerned with gender 
per se and thus offer little illumination of the experience o f criminal women.”50 In 
studying women accused of crime as individuals rather than as an entire group, “women 
have emerged as far more feisty, individual and complex,” people, whose behaviour 
varies according to individual circumstances.51 Just as criminal historians study men’s 
criminality according to factors besides gender, so too should historians who study 
women’s criminality.
In addition to the inevitable gender comparison, the belief in the law’s chivalrous 
treatment of women harms the study of female criminality by further discounting their 
actions. As previously discussed, the law was a complex process that involved a great 
number of discretionary decisions. People were often unwilling to prosecute women, and 
some historians argue that juries were less willing to convict women than men.52 In her 
study of theft before the Old Bailey, MacKay found that “women were almost twice as 
likely to be found not guilty or to have their sentences reduced as were men who pleaded 
distress or who asked for mercy.”53 This finding seems to support the chivalry thesis; 
however, Walker found that although juries were more likely to acquit women, once 
convicted, a woman was more likely to hang than a convicted man.54 In addition, Beattie 
argues that pressure to extend benefit o f clergy to women stemmed not from any need to
50 Garthine Walker, “Women, theft and the world o f  stolen goods,” in Jenny Kermode and Garthine 
Walker, eds., Women, Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1994), 81.
51 Walker and Kermode, “Introduction,” 21.
52 The chivalry thesis is best explained in Otto Poliak’s 1961 sociological study o f  female criminals. 
Poliak, Criminality o f  Women, 4-5, 151.
53 MacKay, “Why They Stole,” 627.
54 Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order, 135-136.
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treat women more fairly, but actually to convince juries to convict more women.55 
Despite such evidence to the contrary, the belief persists that the law treated women more 
leniently than it treated men. Some historians point to coverture and coercion as 
examples o f leniency towards married women. As Peter King argues, single women 
were more vulnerable to prosecution because married women benefited from coverture. 
The concept o f “co-defendant immunity” and married women’s obvious dependant status 
meant that fewer married women were prosecuted and convicted than single and 
widowed women.56 In contrast, Robert Shoemaker argues that coverture “seems to have 
resulted in women being discharged without punishment or receiving milder punishments 
than men, rather than their not being prosecuted or punished at all.”57 Both these 
arguments, along with the majority o f historians who discuss married women’s crime, 
assume that the defence of coercion excused married women from criminal liability.58 
This assumption means that married women are left out of the history of crime.
However, previous studies of crime have shown that what the law meant in theory and 
what actually happened in practice differed. So why should coverture be the exception to 
this rule? In cases involving property and civil law, judges used discretion when 
applying coverture, as did judges and juries in the criminal law. Coverture did not mean 
that married women did not commit crimes or were not accused o f crimes, nor did it 
mean that they were never held liable for their actions. Rather, coverture and the defence
55 J.M. Beattie, “Crime and Inequality in Eighteenth-Century London,” in Crime and Inequality, ed. John 
Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson (California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 137; J.M. Beattie, Policing and  
Punishment in London, 1660-1750: Urban Crime and the Limits o f  Terror, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 7 2 ,3 1 8 ,3 2 1 .
56 Peter King, “Female offenders, work and life-cycle change in late eighteenth-century London,” 
Continuity and Change 11:1 (1996), 69.
57 Robert B. Shoemaker, Gender in English Society 1650-1850: The Emergence o f  Separate Spheres? 
(Essex: Addison W esley Longman Limited, 1998), 297.
58 King, “Female offenders,” 68; Beattie, “Criminality o f  Women,” 87.
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of coercion meant that the criminal courts treated married women differently than single 
women. It is therefore necessary to examine individual cases in order to see how 
coverture actually worked within the criminal justice system of eighteenth-century 
England.
Subordination or Protection?
Eighteenth-century London was a patriarchal and hierarchical society. Women 
occupied a subordinate position within this hierarchy. The law was just one way that 
women were kept subordinate. Coverture and the corresponding unity o f person enforced 
the subordinate status of married women within marriage.59 However, to focus solely on 
the patriarchal aspects of coverture is to miss other important aspects o f its character and 
purpose. Eighteenth-century commentators such as Sir William Blackstone claimed that 
coverture made women the favourites o f the English law. Blackstone argued that the 
legal rights, duties and disabilities of husband and wife stemmed from unity of person. 
However, even the disabilities a wife gained upon marriage were designed for her 
benefit.60 Men were “conscious o f a natural title [women had] to [their] protection and 
good offices.”61 Coverture, in other words, was a paternalistic doctrine. If women were 
willing to submit themselves and accept their subordinate position, the courts would treat 
them as children, which meant that they could enjoy freedom from certain legal 
responsibilities. It is this protection from responsibility, inherent in the paternalism of 
coverture, which Hendrik Hartog argues is what Blackstone meant by married women
59 A woman’s classification depended on her marital status and different rules governed the behaviour o f  
single, married, and widowed women. These rules all functioned to maintain wom en’s subordinate status. 
However, as coverture primarily affected married women, it is married women who form the subeject o f  
the bulk o f  this essay.
60 Blackstone, Commentaries I, 430 ,433 .
61 Gregory, “A Father’s Legacy,” 49.
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being the favourites o f the law.62 In fact, as Sara Mendelson and Patricia Crawford 
demonstrate, “there was some small margin o f equitable feeling that [women] were less 
responsible than males. The law in its framing and administration contained some 
elements of chivalry towards women as dependants.”63 However, as this thesis will 
show, this chivalry was extremely limited. It implied protection and limited rights rather 
than a complete carte blanche. It only existed if women played by the rules and 
submitted to male authority. Once the law started recognizing women as independent 
persons or women showed independent thought and action, the protections and benefits 
o f coverture disappeared. In this sense, coverture benefited those who were willing to 
accept a subordinate position, but treated those who did not accept subordination harshly. 
It was ultimately concerned with order and control rather than protection. Although 
Blackstone and other commentators argued that the defence o f coercion showed 
favouritism, a study of the Old Bailey records reveals otherwise. Claims of coercion 
could excuse a married woman’s crime because she did it in obedience to her husband. It 
was not designed to favour women, but rather to enforce married women’s subordinate 
position within marriage by reinforcing the stricture of obedience. Coverture was both 
paternal and patriarchal; however, its classification depended on individual circumstances 
and behaviour.
As John P. Zomchick notes, women occupied a contradictory place in society. A 
“woman, figured both as a subject who threatens domestic social order and as a 
vulnerable object o f value who is endangered by hostile social forces in the public
62 Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
169.
53 Mendelson and Crawford, Women in Early Modern England, 37.
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sphere.”64 Eighteenth-century law sought to maintain the submission of women, 
especially since many people thought that women could “easily undermine [men’s] 
rightful power, resources, and freedom within the family”; what Anna Clark defines as 
the “struggle for the breeches.”65 However, there was still some concern over protecting 
women. As the previous discussion of paternalism illustrates, women who accepted their 
subordinate status were treated as children before the law. Coverture worked to maintain 
this situation. The Old Bailey records show that if  a married woman followed the rules 
of society and conformed to the ideal gender roles and behaviour, the law treated her as 
lacking liability and she could therefore enjoy the “privileges” of coverture. However, if 
a wife stepped out of line and transgressed proper gender roles, authorities, with their 
ever present anxiety about maintaining social and gender hierarchies, would step in and 
seek to reinforce order. Rather than the previous assumptions about the universality of 
coercion, I argue that it was only those who maintained a submissive role who could 
expect to benefit from coverture. Any semblance of independent action or conflict within 
the household forfeited the “benefits” of coverture. This argument connects the 
seemingly irreconcilable views of eighteenth-century commentators and modem 
feminists. Coverture could benefit women; however, it remained a potent symbol of 
patriarchy designed to maintain the subordinate position o f women. One can see this 
double function o f coverture by looking at its application in the criminal courts. Since 
the defence of coercion was a benefit of coverture, it is possible to determine the extent 
of favouritism that women experienced by examining when judges and juries decided to
64 John P. Zomchick, ‘“ A Penetration Which Nothing Can D eceive’: Gender and Juridicial Discourse in 
Some Eighteenth-Century Narratives,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900  29:3 (1989), 536.
65 Clark, The Struggle fo r  the Breeches, 87.
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apply the defence o f coercion, and when they decided that a married woman was liable 
for her criminal actions.
The Old Bailey, London’s central criminal court, provides a rich resource of 
criminal cases. The Old Bailey Sessions Papers (hereafter OBSP) were an “early species 
of periodical journalism, purveying a diet of true-life crime stories for the interest and 
amusement o f a nonlawyer readership.”66 The Old Bailey, the central criminal court for 
London and Middlesex, sat eight times a year. Its sessions were recorded and a 
compressed version of the proceedings was published shortly after each session in 
pamphlet form and sold on London’s streets. While the OBSP were pamphlets, there is 
no reason to doubt their accuracy. Criminal trials were public affairs and the “reputation 
of the [OBSP] would have quickly suffered if the accounts had been unreliable.”67 So 
reliable were the OBSP that judges and juries often used the pamphlets to determine what 
had happened in previous and related cases and in their decisions to apply clemency, 
including pardoning decisions.68 Despite their volume and their accuracy, the OBSP are 
not a perfect source. These were above all pamphlets and the “limitations on space and 
considerations of reader preferences meant that the most fully reported trials were those 
which involved sex or violence, or were thought to be entertaining or amusing.”69 The 
Old Bailey heard a number o f cases, and they were not all interesting. Average and 
“uninteresting” cases often relate the name of the accused, the prosecutor, the crime and 
the verdict. The publishers excluded testimony, details and sometimes even cases in
66 John Langbein, “ Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources.” The 
University o f  Chicago Law Review  50:1 (1983), 4.
67 “The Value o f  the Proceedings as a Historical Source,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/proceedings/value.html> 2005.
68 Langbein, “Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial,” 16-17; Simon Devereaux, “The City and the 
Sessions Paper: ‘Public Justice’ in London, 1770-1800,” Journal o f  British Studies 35:4 (1996), 471, 501 - 
502.
69 “Value o f  the Proceedings.”
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
20
order to keep the OBSP affordable and accessible to the ordinary people. The OBSP had 
to sell, and the publishers kept their audience in mind when determining what to omit 
from the proceedings. These omissions can often be frustrating and do not provide a 
complete picture o f the eighteenth-century criminal trial. Despite the partial transcripts, 
information is still available in the OBSP that is unavailable elsewhere. As Langbein 
explains, “To write legal history from the OBSP i s , . . .  a perilous undertaking, which we 
would gladly avoid if superior sources availed us. However . . .  the OBSP are probably 
the best accounts we shall ever have of what transpired in ordinary English criminal
70courts before the late eighteenth century.” It is because o f their superiority as an 
available source that they are prevalent in modem scholarship of eighteenth-century 
criminality and that they are used as the basis of this thesis.
While married women make up a minority of the people accused in the Old 
Bailey archive, they are still present. This study uses the cases o f married women 
accused of theft-related offences and killing-related offences in the Old Bailey between 
1700 and 1799 to determine the practical application o f coverture. In doing so, it 
provides answers to not only how the courts treated married women, but also how they 
dealt with concepts of individualism and separate identities within marriage, despite what 
coverture meant in theory. It also seeks to examine how the claims o f Blackstone and 
other legal commentators that coverture was a beneficial doctrine that made women the 
favourites o f the law can be reconciled with modern critiques of coverture as oppressive. 
Chapter two provides this overview of the differing purposes, functions and 
interpretations of coverture. This is necessary in order to contextualize the cases since
70 John Langbein, “The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers,” The University o f  Chicago Law Review  45:2 
(1978), 271.
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one cannot look at the defence o f coercion without first understanding the purpose of 
coverture. However, the most important aspect of this study is that it brings married 
women into the criminal historical perspective.
In order to give married female criminals and married women accused of crime 
their place in the history o f eighteenth-century criminality, one must look at the cases 
themselves. The third chapter therefore examines the accusations of married women for 
theft-related offences. It is in these cases that one expects to find judges and juries 
applying the defence of coercion; however, the cases show that judges and juries used 
their discretion in their decisions about whether or not to apply the defence o f coercion. 
Chapter four discusses married women accused o f killing-related offences. The defence 
o f coercion was not applicable in murder cases, as murder was completely 
uncharacteristic of feminine roles. Therefore, one does not expect to find any mention of 
the defence o f coercion within these cases. The final chapter brings married women into 
the criminal historical perspective. Long ignored or discounted, married women deserve 
a place in criminal history. Their actions, although technically excusable, were 
nevertheless important. Married women’s crimes bring together a number of 
historiographical fields. In doing so, it brings historians to a closer understanding of the 
complicated legal doctrine of coverture.
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C h a p t e r  2: P u r p o s e s  a n d  I n t e r p r e t a t io n s  o f  C o v e r t u r e
“I  know that you could be neither happy nor respectable unless you 
truly esteemed your husband -  unless you looked up to him as a 
superior. ” -Mr. Bennett to Elizabeth Bennett
Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, 1813.
Marriage changed the legal status of women in the eighteenth century. After 
marriage, a woman was subject to the common law doctrine of coverture and all her 
rights, privileges and disadvantages stemmed from this doctrine. According to the Bible, 
marriage bound a man and a woman together and created one flesh. The law reflected 
this premise by regarding husband and wife as one person: the husband.71 Coverture 
refers to the “collective label for the legal disabilities attendant on wifehood.”72 These 
disabilities could be severe, but coverture was not always harmful to women. There is 
considerable debate about the purposes of coverture, and modem historians often regard 
coverture differently than did eighteenth-century commentators. A well-known 
eighteenth-century proverb held that “England was a paradise for women,” and many 
legal commentators held that this proverb sprang from the privileges attendant on 
wifehood and the protection that coverture provided for women.73 However, coverture 
was not universally praised in the eighteenth century. In 1706, Mary Astell asked the 
famous question: “If all Men are bom free, how is it that all Women are bom Slaves?” 
which demonstrates that coverture did not enjoy universal approval.74 Nor does the 
disagreement end there. Modem historians debate the actual purpose o f coverture. Early
71 “After the commencement o f  [marriage], there remain no longer separate interests; the two individuals 
become united, and are therefore to enjoy the same felicity and suffer the same misfortunes.” M oral 
Essays, chiefly collectedfrom  different authors, Volume I (Liverpool, 1796), 223.
72 Maeve E. Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law in Victorian England (Columbia: University o f  
South Carolina Press, 1993), 34.
73 Baron and Feme: A Treatise o f  the Common Law Concerning Husbands and Wives (London, 1700), 4.
74 Mary Astell, Reflections Upon Marriage. The Third Edition (London, 1706), xi. This quote is used quite 
frequently in modem scholarship to explain how the law oppressed women.
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feminist analyses brought forth a criticism of coverture and stressed its contribution to 
patriarchy and the subjugation of women. Initially, this analysis focused on the role that 
coverture played in the oppression o f women, and it later evolved to examine how 
women operated within the patriarchal system.75 However, more recent scholarship, 
including works of feminist historians, has argued that coverture was not as oppressive as
7  f \originally argued. In practice, discretion tempered the harshness of theoretical 
coverture; in much the same way that discretion limited the severity of the criminal law, 
discretion limited the severity o f coverture.77 While coverture attempted to enforce the 
ideal gender relations, authorities recognized that these could be too harsh in practice. By 
using discretion and limiting the severity o f husbands in practice, authorities, judges and 
juries ensured that coverture gained legitimacy in the eyes of many eighteenth-century 
women as well as men.
In order to understand the workings and competing purposes o f coverture, one 
must look at a number of different areas. The first is the actual definition of coverture.78 
From here, it is possible to gain a sense o f the gender ideals of the eighteenth century that 
coverture was meant to enforce. Joanne Bailey asked if coverture “favoured or 
oppressed” married women? Since this question is so central to the understanding of
75 See for example: Anne Kugler, “Constructing W ifely Identity: Prescription and Practice in the Life o f  
Lady Sarah Cowper,” Journal o f  British Studies 40:3 (2001), 291-323; Robert H. Michel, “English 
Attitudes Towards Women, 1640-1700,” Canadian Journal o f  History 13:1 (1978), 35-60; W.R. Prest, 
“Law and W omen’s Rights in Early Modem England,” The Seventeenth Century 6:2 (1991), 169-187.
76 See in particular Joanne Bailey, Unquiet Lives: M arriage and M arriage Breakdown in England, 1660- 
1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Amy Louise Erickson, Women and Property in 
Early Modern England (London: Routledge, 1995).
77 See Introduction for historical debates surrounding discretion and the criminal law. Tim Stretton, 
“Married Women and the Law in England since the Eighteenth-Century,” L 'Homme, Zeitschriftfur 
Feministische Gescchichtswissenschaft 14 (2003), 126; Tim Stretton, “Women, Property and Law,” in A 
Blackwell Companion to Early M odern Women's Writing, ed. Anita Pacheco (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Limited, 2002), 41.
78 As Tim Stretton argues, “To be fully effective the doctrine o f  coverture had to be invoked, and before 
individuals could invoke it they had to understand it.” Tim Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 131.
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coverture, one must also examine debates surrounding these competing outcomes. Did 
coverture help or hinder women? Rather than one or the other, the answer seems to lie in 
more o f a grey area in between. Coverture had oppressive characteristics, but it could 
also benefit some women, and its stated goal was to maintain harmony rather than 
oppress women. In order to understand this argument, one must look at the recent 
scholarship of historians who look at coverture as neither wholly beneficial nor harmful 
to women. It is in their work that one can fully see how eighteenth-century men and 
women reconciled their competing interests and formed a household unit, which
70
consisted of cooperative, not competing individuals.
Under coverture, the law assumed that a husband and wife had one identity, 
which was that of the husband. As Sir William Blackstone explained, “the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she 
performs everything.”80 Upon marriage, a woman lost her legal identity, which meant 
that she lost a number o f other privileges. These privileges included the ability to make 
contracts, to sue or be sued without her husband, or to assert and defend her rights in 
court unless she did so in the presence of her husband. One of the primary functions of 
coverture was in combining property, and a wife forfeited her property rights to her 
husband for the duration of her marriage. As Mary Poovey explains, “most of a woman’s 
property became her husband’s absolutely when she married, whether she brought that 
property into the marriage or acquired it subsequently. All o f a married woman’s income
79 Bailey, Unquiet Lives', Nancy E. Wright, Margaret W. Ferguson and A.R. Buck, eds., Women, Property 
and the Letters o f  the Law in Early Modern England  (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2004); 
Margaret J.M. Ezell, The P atriarch ’s Wife: Literary Evidence and the H istory o f  the Family (Chapel Hill 
and London: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1987).
80 Blackstone, Commentaries /, 430.
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belonged to her husband.” Married women could not inherit independently, nor could 
a married woman accept gifts, even from her husband.82 Property rights ensured a 
husband could control his wife through economic means. Although wives were not 
technically the property of their husbands, coverture still ensured that under the law, 
husbands had a great deal of power over their wives.83
Marriage changed the lives and legal status o f men and women. When a man 
married in early modem England, he began to head a household, which conferred a 
higher status associated with house-holding.84 In addition to giving him a higher status, 
marriage increased a man’s responsibilities. As William Fleetwood explained in 1722, 
“there is no Relation in the World, either natural or civil, and agreed upon, but there is a 
reciprocal Duty obliging each Party.”85 Marriage was not a one-way property transfer.
In return for his wife’s property, a husband assumed responsibility for his wife’s actions, 
including her debts and even some of her crimes. A husband was also responsible for 
maintaining and providing for his wife at a level appropriate to his and  her social status.86 
As David Lemmings argues, “Femes covert. . . exchanged their legal independence for
• 07
the status, care, and protection supposedly provided by marriage.” Conversely, as 
Margaret Hunt explains, “the responsibility to maintain the wife was the quid pro quo for
81 Mary Poovey, “Covered but Not Bound: Caroline Norton and the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act,” 
Feminist Studies 14:3 (1988), 474.
82 Stretton, Women Waging Law, 22-23.
83 The power o f  coverture was especially extensive because a valid marriage could only be dissolved 
through an Act o f  Parliament, which was particularly expensive. Therefore, divorce was not an option for 
most people in eighteenth-century England.
84 Alexandra Shepard, Meanings o f  M anhood in Early Modern England  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 70, 74; Shoemaker, Gender in English Society, 91.
85 Fleetwood, The relative duties, 68.
86 Stretton, “Married Women and the Law,” 125; Susan Staves, “Pin Money,” Studies in Eighteenth- 
Century Culture 14 (1985), 49; Bailey, Unquiet Lives, 62.
87 David Lemmings, “W omen’s Property, Popular Cultures, and the Consistory Court o f  London in the 
Eighteenth Century,” in Women, Property and the Letters o f  the Law in Early Modern England, ed. Nancy 
E. Wright, Margaret W. Ferguson and A.R. Buck (Toronto, University o f  Toronto Press, 2004), 69. See 
also: Michel, “Attitudes Towards Women,” 56.
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her obedience and sexual services.”88 Both men and women saw coverture and marriage 
as a trade-off. It conferred rights and status, while constraining behaviour and assigning 
differing responsibilities. There is no argument against the belief that marriage was a 
hierarchical relationship. However, one must not forget that status carried 
responsibilities towards one’s dependants. The reciprocal obligations o f husbands and 
wives to one another are central to an understanding of coverture.
Favoured or Oppressed? Competing Purposes o f Coverture 
In 1744, John Gregory wrote, “a married state, if  entered into from proper motives 
o f esteem and affection, will be the happiest for yourselves, make you most respectable in 
the eyes of the world, and the most useful members of society.”89 When one begins to 
research coverture, it is natural to turn to Blackstone and his adage that “even the 
disabilities which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her protection and 
benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.”90 Blackstone was 
not alone in arguing that women were the favourites of the law.91 So how could these 
commentators argue that the legal disabilities inherent in coverture actually benefited 
women? Coverture was patriarchal, but at the same time, it was also paternal. As Joan 
R. Gundersen explains, eighteenth-century people “did not equate dependency with 
abject powerlessness, but rather thought it a relationship in which rights and duties
09accrued to both parties.” A husband had certain responsibilities toward his wife, and it
88 Margaret R. Hunt, “Wives and marital ‘rights’ in the Court o f  Exchequer in the early eighteenth century,” 
in Londinopolis: Essays in the Cultural and Social H istory o f  Early Modern London, ed. Paul Griffiths and 
Mark S.R. Jenner (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 107.
89 Gregory “A Father’s Legacy,” 52.
90 Blackstone, Commentaries /, 433.
91 Baron and Feme, 4.
92 Joan R. Gundersen, “Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution,” Signs 13:1 (1987), 60.
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was these paternal responsibilities, which coverture guaranteed, that eighteenth-century 
commentators and people saw as beneficial to women.93
Alison Plowden argues that the lot of unmarried women in early modem England 
was particularly hard. She explains that a spinster “could normally expect little more 
than a life of dependent drudgery under some charitable relation’s roof.”94 Bridget Hill 
also points out that single women and widows predominate in the parish lists for poor 
relief.95 Single women were particularly disadvantaged in the economic system of 
eighteenth-century England. Since a husband’s support of his wife and household was 
central to coverture, commentators argued that wives benefited from their dependant 
status. As Robert H. Michel explains, marriage offered women “physical and 
psychological protection -  economic support and companionship -  in a harsh society 
filled with hazards to those who were alone, unemployed, unhealthy, and unattached to a 
family.”96 In addition to this economic protection, Michel demonstrates that 
commentators “argued that the divine and human laws which subjugated females actually 
protected them . .  . from the slavery which they, as the weaker sex, must expect in a state
93 However it is important to note that it was difficult to enforce these responsibilities if  the husband chose 
to ignore his prescribed role and duties.
94 Alison Plowden, Tudor Women: Queens and Commoners (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 
1998), 164.
95 Bridget Hill, Women Alone: Spinsters in England, 1600-1850  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 
96. Despite their often lower economic status, it was still possible for a woman to remain single throughout 
her lifetime. As Christine Peters points out, “the existence o f  choice [ in ] . . .  whether or not to marry at all, 
represents a significant acknowledgement that wom en’s lives were not inevitably defined by marriage.” 
Christine Peters, “Single women in early modem England: attitudes and expectations,” Continuity and  
Change 12:3 (1997), 326. See also: Amy M. Froide, Never Married: Singlewomen in Early Modern 
England  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1-5, 7 ,44-49 , 117-119, 152-153, 217-221.
96 Michel, “Attitudes Towards Women,” 56. As Amy Louise Erickson argues, “Even under the restrictions 
o f  coverture, marriage was still wom en’s best hope o f  financial security.” Erickson, Women and Property, 
91.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
28
Q7
of nature.” Coverture favoured married women by guaranteeing them protection and 
support, which single women could not expect.
Although the aspects of coverture relating to property seem especially harsh, 
commentators felt that these were actually beneficial to married women. Coverture 
limited the strategic behaviour o f a husband “to use his wife’s separate identity and 
separate estate to achieve his own ends.”98 As Margaret Hunt demonstrates in her study 
of wife beating, separate settlements o f property were often a cause of abuse. A husband 
who wanted control of the money from his wife’s separate estate often beat or threatened 
his wife so that she would sign over her possession and control to him.99 By not having 
separate property, coverture actually protected wives from potential abuse. Joseph 
Addison and Richard Steele contended that ‘“ Separate Purses, between Man and Wife, 
are . . .  as unnatural as Separate Beds.’”100 The complete dependence o f a wife on her 
husband encouraged a man’s love for his wife and made a wife attempt to please her 
husband at all costs.101 By not allowing them to have separate property, coverture 
protected wives from potential abuse, and combined assets actually encouraged harmony 
within the household, which was the goal of marriage. Other unforeseen benefits also 
supposedly stemmed from the lack of property. As A treatise o f  feme coverts pointed out 
in 1732, “a feme covert hath not any goods that can be stolen”, therefore she could never 
be the victim of theft.102 In addition, the law felt it necessary to protect even the wives of
97 Michel, “Attitudes Towards Women,” 41.
98 Hartog, Man and Wife, 169.
99 Margaret Hunt, “Wife Beating, Domesticity and W omen’s Independence in Eighteenth-Century 
London,” Gender and H istory 4:1 (1992), 17. See also: Susan Moller Okin, “Patriarchy and Married 
W omen’s Property in England: Questions on Some Current Views,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 17:2 
(1983), 134.
100 As quoted in: Hunt, “Wife Beating,” 26.
101 Ibid.
102 A treatise offem e coverts: or the la d y ’s law  (London, 1732), 87.
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felons. Unlike children, who lost their inheritance if their father committed a felony, 
wives did not lose their dower or jointure except in cases o f treason. However, a husband 
whose wife was convicted of a felony only received curtesy if they had issue before she 
committed the felony.103
While Blackstone and other legal commentators argued that coverture was 
beneficial, not all of their eighteenth-century contemporaries agreed with this analysis. 
Mary Astell argued in 1706 that a wife “was made to be a Slave to [her husband’s] Will, 
and has no higher end than to Serve and Obey him!”104 Astell also argued that “Marriage 
is a very Happy State for Men,” but there was no corresponding happy state for 
women.105 In another response to the argument that England was a paradise for women, 
Sarah Chapone responded in 1735 by saying that it was also a paradise for men.
Chapone argued that “no subjects enjoy such invaluable experiences as [men] do 
here.” 106 She felt that the image of the benevolent husband held as much force as a 
tyrannical prince arguing that he treated his subjects better “than the Grand Seignior 
treated his slaves in Turkey.” 107 These eighteenth-century feminist commentators agreed 
that marriage benefited husbands rather than wives. However unique their voices were in 
the eighteenth century, modem historians have given them more force in today’s analyses 
of the purpose and function of coverture.
“The operation of the English Common Law governing the ownership and 
inheritance o f property seems to offer compelling proof o f the utter subjection of
103 Ibid, 53, 68, 75.
104 Astell, Reflections, 47.
105 Ibid, 91-92.
106 Sarah Chapone, The hardships o f  the English laws in relation to wives (Dublin, 1735), 45-46.
107 Ibid, 46.
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1 HRwomen.” Property was an important part of eighteenth-century life and property 
ownership helped confer citizenship.109 Unable to own and control property, married 
women could never be full citizens. While some may argue that property and its 
transference through marriage contracts was important only to the elite, Amy Louise 
Erickson has demonstrated that “the only people to whom property was unimportant in 
marriage were the vagrant poor.”110 Coverture meant that women lost control o f their 
property when they married. A married woman had no possessions to call her own and 
her support was dependent on her husband’s goodwill and generosity. Depending on the 
character o f the husband for one’s support was not necessarily a good thing. In addition, 
as Hunt points out, men could and did use “their property rights and their economic 
superiority as weapons.”111 If a woman was in an abusive marriage, she often could not 
leave the marriage because doing so would mean she had no means o f economic support. 
Since she neither owned nor could own anything, a woman who left her husband 
effectively declared herself an outlaw.112 Hunt explains that husbands could treat their 
wives in virtually any way that they wanted, without threat of the wife leaving since they 
“knew that when the alternative was starvation, many wives would beg to be taken 
back.”113
Women could avoid some of the property restrictions of coverture, provided they 
took the necessary precautions before marriage. Equity courts recognized that married 
women could have separate property in the form of trusts and jointures, which, as Susan
108 Christine Churches, “Women and property in England: a case study,” Social H istory 23:2 (1998), 165.
109 As the previous chapter showed, property was central to the criminal law. It enjoyed such importance in 
eighteenth-century England that assault was a misdemeanour whereas theft was a felony.
110 Erickson, Women and Property, 85.
111 Hunt, “Wife Beating,” 19.
112 Lawrence Stone, The R oad to Divorce: England 1530-1987  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 4- 
5.
"3 Hunt, “Wife Beating,” 19.
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Staves argues, “broke the hegemony of the common law rules giving husbands control 
over wives’ property.”114 Trusts and jointures kept property out of the hands of husbands 
and enabled women to be secure in the knowledge that they would have an income in 
their widowhood, even if their husband squandered his fortune. Jointures and trusts were 
also important in separation cases, which gave women a greater degree o f freedom in 
certain instances. However, marriage settlements, jointures and trusts were not always 
beneficial to women. Under the common law, a widow was entitled to a life interest in 
one-third of her husband’s real property. If she had a jointure, dower was forfeit and a 
woman would often inherit less under the jointure than she would have under dower. In 
addition, separate property settlements did not mean that the control of the property went 
directly to the woman. They were often designed to protect family interests and to keep 
the money and property out of the hands o f a potentially bad son-in-law. Their primary 
intent was not to give the money or property to the woman under coverture.115 In 
addition, most women saw their separate property as something to provide for themselves 
in their widowhood rather than something to benefit them in marriage. Under the 
common law doctrine of coverture, married women could not own property and even 
under the less stringent laws of equity, married women’s separate property was not 
always meant to benefit women in the marriage itself.
According to Linda Colley ‘“ a woman could not by definition be a citizen and 
could never look to possess political rights.’”116 As Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman 
explain, economic independence was a criterion for citizenship in the eighteenth-century.
114 Susan Staves, M arried Women's Separate Property in England, 1660-1833 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 31.
115 Okin, “Questions,” 125.
116 As quoted in Judy M. Cornett, “Hoodwink’d by Custom: The Exclusion o f  Women from Juries in 
Eighteenth-Century Law and Literature,” William and M ary Journal o f  Women and the Law  4 (1997), 85.
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Since women were always actual or potential dependants, based on their inability to own 
property when married, they would forever remain secondary “citizens” dependent on 
others and not actually part of the political landscape, whereas men could transcend this 
qualification and become citizens.117 Coverture, which meant that married women could 
not own property and therefore could not be citizens, did more than just take away the 
citizenship of married women. A husband’s identity covered his wife’s legal identity 
during marriage. As Norma Basch explains, “the legal invisibility o f the wife” was the 
corollary of the “legal oneness of the husband and wife.”118 She continues to argue “any 
equation in which one plus one equals one by virtue o f the woman’s invisibility was a 
vivid symbol o f male dominion in a cultural as well as a legal context.”119 While wives 
did not cease to exist in marriage, they underwent a civil death, which meant that they
190lost both power and recognition before the law and in certain other contexts. Modem
critics of coverture rightly argue that the loss of legal personhood was definitely not a
benefit of coverture. It went further than just taking away the citizenship of married
women, preventing the law from recognizing a married woman’s existence except when
121her actions removed the “protections” of coverture.
Some scholars take the argument further than the simple loss of legal personhood 
in marriage. They speak o f wives as slaves to their husbands due to their loss of identity
117 Teresa Brennan and Carole Patemen, ‘“ Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth’: Women and the 
Origins o f  Liberalism,” Political Studies 27:2 (1979), 196. See also Clark, The Struggle fo r  the Breeches, 
142. Widows however had an odd position, as they were neither dependant nor always expected to remarry. 
Despite their ability to hold property, widows could still not be full citizens because o f  their gender, not 
their propertyholding status.
118 Norma Basch, “Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction o f  Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America,” 
Feminist Studies 5:2 (1979), 347.
1,9 Ibid, 354.
120 Elizabeth Fowler, “Civil Death and the Maiden: Agency and the Conditions o f  Contract in Piers 
Plowman," Speculum  70:4 (1995), 768.
121 Frances E. Dolan, “Battered Women, Petty Traitors, and the Legacy o f  Coverture,” Feminist Studies 
29:2 (2003), 256.
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before the law and the corresponding loss of freedom.122 As Carole Pateman argues,
“The status of ‘wife’ affirmed that a woman lacked the capacities o f an ‘individual’; she 
became the property o f her husband and stood to him as a slave/servant to a master.”123 
Pateman also classifies wives as slaves since their work within the household was unpaid, 
and was therefore slavery.124 Scholars such as Pateman argue that this was an unbearable 
situation and stemmed from the subordinate status of women. Since married women 
were not independent persons, their personhood belonged to someone else: their 
husbands. However, married women were never the actual property o f their husbands.
As Erickson argues, “Many men would have liked to regard women as property in and of 
themselves; but while married women’s legal disabilities put them in the same category 
with idiots, convicted criminals and infants, they were never legally classed with 
chattels.” Rather, the eighteenth-century definition of slavery differed from the 
modem interpretation of chattel slavery. Shanley points out that rather than the concept 
o f property in women, Mary Wollstonecroft “found women’s inability to earn money, 
married women’s legal incapacity to hold property in their own names and mothers’ 
inability to have custody of their children sure marks o f their slavery.” In the 
eighteenth-century freedom was not “absolute but rather [varied] according to status: for 
slaves, as for servants and wives, ‘liberty rightly understood . . .  is protection,’ not
122 Mary Lyndon Shanley, “Mary Wollstonecroft on sensibility, wom en’s rights and patriarchal power,” in 
Women writers and the early modern British po litica l tradition, ed. Hilda L. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 158-159; Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), 119, 120-124, 130-131; Stone, The R oad to Divorce, 13. These are just some o f  the examples 
that approximate married women with slaves.
123 Pateman, Sexual Contract, 130-131.
124 Ibid, 124. This argument could also be applied today to unpaid household labour, however, this labour 
is often not characterized as a form o f  slavery. However, this does not seem to be the case today.
125 Erickson, Women and Property, 232-233. See also Janelle Greenberg, “The Legal Status o f  the English 
Woman in Early Eighteenth-Century Common Law and Equity,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 4 
(1975), 172, 175.
126 Shanley, “Mary Wollstonecroft,” 163.
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equality with the rights of their masters.” 127 Unlike the modem dichotomy of free and 
unfree, eighteenth-century law saw a third option of “personal dominion that did not 
involve commercial exchange.”128 In this sense, husbands could have property in their 
wives through personal dominion, but a husband could not own his wife in the sense that 
he could sell her. Teresa Michaels demonstrates that a husband who sold his wife in a 
wife sale, made the “mistake o f treating an archaic form of real property as if  it were a 
mere moveable thing.”129 Modem analyses of coverture that argue married women were 
slaves mistakenly equate the eighteenth-century interpretation of slavery with modem 
interpretations of chattel slavery. Blackstone and other legal commentators did not see 
the right to claim personhood as freedom, but rather saw freedom as a “person’s 
fundamental right to the absolute ownership o f property.” 130 Since married women could 
not own property, they could not enjoy liberty; however, they were not chattels, which 
modem interpretations o f coverture as slavery seem to imply.
Historians who criticize coverture often point to its role in wife beating and its 
corresponding justifications to show that coverture was harmful to married women. As 
Maeve Doggett explains, “It was an acceptance of the husband’s right to physical control 
of his wife which lay at the heart of the legal construction of the marital relationship. Far 
from being a consequence of coverture, the husband’s right of control was its very 
essence.,,m  Since a husband was responsible for his wife’s actions, the law allowed him 
to use physical force to control her behaviour. Those who were in positions of power
127 Teresa Michaels, ‘“ That Sole and Despotic Dominion’: Slaves, Wives and Game in Blackstone’s 




131 Doggett, Marriage, Wife Beating and the Law, 35.
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demonstrated their power by controlling their subordinates and violence was one way for
those in authority to maintain this control.132 Eighteenth-century society saw limited
violence as an acceptable and necessary way to maintain order and to punish one’s 
• 1subordinates. Parents used physical force to punish their children, just as masters and 
mistresses used violent means of punishing their apprentices and servants, as did the state 
in its punishment of criminals. Violence pervaded hierarchical relationships, and 
marriage was no exception. However, married women were particularly disadvantaged 
because there were very few ways to escape an abusive marriage.134 Divorce was 
impossible for all but the very wealthy and informal means o f separation could often 
mean leaving one’s children and facing starvation because o f coverture’s property 
restrictions. Although wife beating was limited in theory, coverture worked to maintain 
the subordinate position of women by limiting the options available to married women in 
an abusive relationship. While wife beating is an extreme example, it did exist and it 
reflected the potential for abuse inherent in the doctrine o f coverture.
Did the law favour or oppress women? The answer is neither one nor the other, 
but rather both. One cannot simplify such a complicated doctrine into an either/or 
situation. The legal disabilities inherent in coverture, combined with other laws designed 
specifically against women, detract from the argument that women were the favourites of
i i c
the English law. While oppressive, one must note that there was no outright rebellion
Amussen, “Punishment, Discipline, and Power,” 4-6, 12-13, 27, 31-32.
133 Susan Dwyer Amussen, ‘“ Being stirred to much unquietness’: Violence and Domestic Violence in Early 
M odem England,” Journal o f  Women's H istory 6:2 (1994), 74; Hunt, “Wife Beating,” 14; Shepard, 
M anhood, 139.
134 Hunt, “Wife Beating,” 20.
135 These laws include the crime o f  infanticide, which reversed the traditional burden o f  proof and petty 
treason, which defined husband murder as an aggravated offence, punishable by death by burning rather 
than hanging. Both these laws were specifically designed to police the morality o f  women and to ensure
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against marriage, and many wives accepted their subordinate status.136 This does not 
excuse the oppressive nature of coverture, but coverture and marriage were a trade-off 
and women made the choice to alter their status. As J.C. Scott argues, ‘“ domination is 
not simply imposed by force but must assume a form that gains social compliance.’”137 
Coverture needed social compliance in order to work effectively, and if it was as 
oppressive as some feminist scholars suggest, it would not have gained that social 
compliance. The problem with these differing interpretations is the sources themselves. 
As previously stated, historians tend to turn to Blackstone when they begin to research 
coverture. While it is important to take account o f the legal treatises, one cannot base an 
argument solely on the prescriptions o f the law. Discretion limited the entire English 
legal system and as such, women experienced coverture in different ways both inside and 
outside formal legal jurisdiction. Not looking at the actual practice of coverture in its 
many differing applications misconstrues its purposes and misses some important 
aspects, in particular the trade-offs inherent in coverture. In return for his wife’s 
property, a husband had certain obligations for the duration o f the marriage. These 
obligations ensured that although coverture had its problems, married women could 
benefit from its existence.138 It is important to recognize that neither the critical 
interpretation nor the eighteenth-century commentators’ interpretations were entirely
that they fulfilled their proper gender roles and maintained the gender order. They are discussed further in 
chapter 4.
136 Fletcher, Gender, 124.
137 As quoted in Michael J. Braddick and John Walter, “Introduction: Grids o f  Power: order, hierarchy and 
subordination in early modem society,” in Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society: Hierarchy and  
Subordination in Britain and Ireland, ed. Michael J. Braddick and John Walter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 5.
138 It is still important to note that despite the theoiy o f  reciprocal obligations, it was often very difficult for 
a married woman to enforce her husband’s duty o f  support.
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right. Coverture, rather, offered a complex mixture of benefits and drawbacks, a grey 
area o f the law that affected individual women in different ways.
The Grey Area
W.R. Prest argues, “the issue of how English women were treated as objects of or
under the law can and should be separated from the question of how far English women
as subjects managed to use that same law to their own ends.”139 Women were not always
the victims o f an oppressive law but often worked within the law, and determined the
limits that the law placed on their lives. It is important to recognize the agency o f women
in practice, which is difficult to do by looking solely at the letter of the law. In addition,
eighteenth-century authorities recognized that married women would not automatically
accept the harsh strictures inherent in theoretical coverture. It was therefore important to
limit the authority of husbands. As Susan Dwyer Amussen explains, “Patriarchy
legitimated itself by claiming that its power was benign; it demonstrated this by accepting
intervention in cases where domestic power was being abused.”140 As previously
discussed, patriarchy was limited and it carried certain responsibilities. In her study of
the Second Earl of Castlehaven’s trial for rape and sodomy, Cynthia Herrup demonstrates
how important this control and limitation of patriarchy could be. It was not
Castlehaven’s sexual behaviour that was so dangerous, but rather his subversion of
patriarchy and the household hierarchy.
By corrupting the ideal o f patriarchy, the Earl revealed too starkly an 
abusive power that all patriarchs sought to cloak over with talk of 
responsibility and benevolence. And in doing so, he also threatened 
the hope that inferiors would believe that the established dispersion
139 W.R. Prest, “Law and Women’s Rights in Early Modem England,” The Seventeenth Century 6:2 (1991), 
183.
140 Amussen, “Being stirred,” 84.
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of power was actually to their advantage.141 
Patriarchy had to be limited in order for it to be effective.142 If it transgressed the 
undefined boundaries, the community or individuals stepped in to limit its abuses. As 
Jennine Hurl-Eamon demonstrates, even abused wives could determine the limits of 
patriarchal power. Although wives were expected to accept a certain amount o f physical 
correction, they used recognizances to force their husbands to keep the peace within the 
household. This allowed wives, the victims of domestic violence, rather than husbands to 
determine what was an acceptable level of violence. This level o f violence was not 
always as extreme as the cases found in petitions for separation.143 In daily life, married 
women defined the boundaries of patriarchy and limited its impact on their lives. It was 
in these definitions that eighteenth-century married women showed that they were not the 
passive victims of an overarching patriarchal system suggested by some historians.
Scholars who focus on married women’s loss of independence, identity and 
property ownership judge the eighteenth century according to modem values of 
individuality and equality. While these are undoubtedly important values, one must 
remember that they did not carry the same force in the eighteenth century that they do 
today. As Margreta de Grazia explains, “Coverture did not incorporate two Lockean 
individuals, each of whom could be ‘seen essentially as the proprietor o f his own person
141 Cynthia Herrup, “The Patriarch at Home: The Trial o f  the Second Earl o f  Castlehaven for Rape and 
Sodomy,” History Workshop Journal 41 (1996), 8, 11, 13.
142 As Elizabeth Foyster explains, “There was a point at which the use o f  physical control could threaten 
rather than enforce patriarchy.” Elizabeth Foyster, “Male Honour, Social Control and Wife Beating in Late 
Stuart England,” Transactions o f  the Royal H istorical Society, 6th series 6 (1996), 217.
143 Often this violence was simply the threat o f  violence, although it did include physical abuse. Jennine 
Hurl-Eamon, Gender and Petty Violence in London, 1680-1720  (Columbus: The Ohio State University 
Press, 2005), 56-57.
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or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.’ For neither is self-owned.”144 She also 
points out that “private property, held individually to the exclusion of others, may be 
more the anomaly than the rule.”145 Rather, as Bailey argues, property benefited the 
entire household despite existing in the husband’s name.146 Eighteenth-century men and 
women did not see marriage as the loss of identity and rights, but rather saw it as the 
combining o f two persons into one household unit, which was neither the husband nor the 
wife, but rather simply the household. It is therefore anachronistic to assume that a 
woman “lost” her identity and legal rights upon marriage. As Margaret J.M. Ezell notes, 
“The twentieth-century interpretation of domestic life in seventeenth-century England 
restricts the activities o f the patriarch’s wife more than the actual practice did.”147 Ezell’s 
argument applies to interpretations o f the eighteenth-century as well. Married women did 
have restricted rights, especially in theory, but these restrictions were limited in practice. 
A successful marriage demanded cooperation and a focus on the loss o f rights, although 
important, misses this key component.
Marriage not only changed the legal status of women, it also affected the lives of 
men. As Alexandra Shepard argues, “While men were often better placed to benefit from 
them, patriarchal imperatives nonetheless constituted attempts to discipline and order 
men as well as women.”148 In addition to the responsibilities imposed by coverture, 
husbands had to conform to expected behaviour and roles. Men were also subject to
144 Margreta de Grazia, “Afterword,” in Women, Property and the Letters o f  the Law in Early Modern 
England, ed. Nancy E. Wright, Margaret W. Ferguson and A.R. Buck (Toronto: University o f  Toronto 
Press, 2004), 301.
145 Ibid, 302.
146 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, 106; Joanne Bailey, “Favoured or Oppressed? Married women, property and 
‘coverture’ in England, 1660-1800,” Continuity and Change 17:3 (2002), 366.
147 Ezell, The P atriarch ’s Wife, 162.
148 Shepard, Manhood, 1.
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other hierarchies, despite their superior status in the gender order.149 Shepard notes that 
“prescriptions of male self-sufficiency, economic independence and responsibility 
towards others informed the ethics o f evaluation by which subtle status distinctions as 
well as broader hierarchies were established.”150 Economic independence was 
impossible for many and husbands therefore relied on the economic contributions of 
wives for personal and familial survival. Husbands also had to rely on their wives’ credit 
reputation for their economic autonomy as much as they had to rely on their own.151 In 
much the same way as the criminal law restrained and benefited eighteenth-century elites, 
marriage and coverture both benefited and restrained a husband’s behaviour.
The goal o f marriage was harmony, and separation cases often complain o f the 
disquiet and lack of harmony in the marital relationship. Coverture was supposed to 
enable husband and wife to live together in harmony by nature of their shared interest: 
the household. Joanne Bailey notes that all married couples had the common ambitions 
“to manage their household economies efficiently and protect their individual and
Ihousehold credit and creditworthiness.” Bailey also argues that marriage was a co­
dependent relationship. Her emphasis on both husbands and wives demonstrates that it 
was often difficult, if not impossible, for either spouse to live without the other.
Although many interpretations o f eighteenth-century family life emphasise the 
importance of a husband’s provision, a wife’s role as household manager was equally 
important. Bailey argues that “the sheer extent and intensity of women’s household
149 Susan Dwyer Amussen, An O rdered Society: Gender and Class in Early M odern England  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988), 3.
150 Alexandra Shepard, “Manhood, Credit and Patriarchy in Early Modem England,” P ast and Present 167 
(2000), 89.
151 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, 75.
152 Ibid, 62.
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government meant that its denial could only occur when husbands had a substitute for 
their wives.”153 In addition to household management, wives also made important 
economic contributions to the household. Their marriage portion often enabled the 
couple to set up an independent household and both spouses contributed their wages and 
labour to what they saw as the familial pool.154 This emphasis on the familial and 
household benefit, rather than individual earnings, gave married women a stake and 
authority within the household. Rather than being simply dependants o f either autocratic 
or benevolent husbands, wives were partners in the domestic relationship. Bailey 
emphasises co-dependency, which undercut male authority, and characterises marriage as 
a partnership, not necessarily between equals, rather than a struggle between 
individuals.155
Shepard argues that “Patriarchal ideology itself was muddled and contradictory, 
and selectively invoked rather than a monolithic system which simply received adherence 
or rejection.”156 Most eighteenth-century commentators believed that the common law 
doctrine of coverture benefited married women. This was a paternalistic argument in 
which married women were protected from the dangers of living without male authority. 
However, using the same sources, some scholars argue that coverture actually oppressed 
wives. Married women’s loss o f legal personhood and property rights ensured their 
subordinate status in the household and throughout life. The problem with these two 
analyses is the sources. While they both raise important points, one must go further than
153 Ibid, 83.
154 Ibid, 109, 193; Shepard, Manhood, 95-96. Interestingly, men who sued their w ife’s lover for criminal 
conversation sometimes turned their settlement over to the defendant. This enabled the ex-wife and her 
lover to set up a new household, which allowed for marriage. Susan Staves, “Money for Honor: Damages 
for Criminal Conversation,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 11 (1982), 291-292.
155 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, 195-196.
156 Shepard, Manhood, 1.
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legal treatises and the letter of the law to see how a legal doctrine such as coverture 
actually worked. If coverture was beneficial to married women, why was it later opposed 
and if coverture was so oppressive why did it last for so long? As Ezell explains, “So 
many gaps existed between the rigid theory and the actual enforcement that its degrading 
and restrictive nature was not immediately felt. Conditions were not intolerable to the 
point o f open rebellion for the majority o f [married] women in their everyday lives.”157 
Coverture existed in a grey area, which ensured that most husbands and wives could live 
in harmony rather than in a constant struggle for the breeches. The discretionary nature 
of coverture limited its severity and gave it legitimacy in the eyes o f eighteenth-century 
English men and women. It is therefore necessary to examine the actual function of 
coverture rather than focusing on the prescriptive commentary. One such way is to 
examine an area of coverture that was theoretically beneficial to women: the defence of 
coercion.
157 Ezell, Patriarch's Wife, 163.
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C h a p t e r  3: T h ie v in g  W iv e s  in  t h e  O l d  B a il e y
The imperious woman raiseth a storm fo r  her own shipwreck, 
and she that affects dominion should be made the slave o f  her 
husband.
-William Kenrick, The Whole Duty o f  Woman, 1764 
According to the eighteenth-century English common law, a married woman was 
not an independent legal person; her identity was subsumed or “covered” under that of 
her husband’s for the duration of the marriage. However, as Frances Dolan argues, it was 
possible for the wife to pop back up into view since her identity and agency were 
understood to be “suspended, covered, or delegated rather than . . .  erased.”158 It was 
when this “cover” disappeared that the law could consider a wife an independent legal 
entity. Dolan studies petty treason, an aggravated form of murder where a wife murders 
her husband. This crime obviously removed a wife’s “cover” and thus placed her in the 
legal record; however, there were other ways a wife could be treated as a person in her 
own right rather than through her husband. Sir William Blackstone explained that “in 
some felonies and other inferior crimes, committed by her, through constraint of her 
husband, the law excuses her: but this extends not to treason or murder.”159 Although he 
acknowledged the defence of marital coercion, Blackstone allowed for the possibility of 
indicting and punishing wives separately from their husbands.160 It is important to 
remember that Blackstone’s Commentaries, although influential, is a legal treatise that 
was not always followed in practice.161 So when was a wife liable for her criminal
158 Dolan, “Battered Women,” 256.
159 Blackstone, Commentaries /, 432.
160 Ibid, 431.
161 Some scholars such as Dolan and Hendrik Hartog have started to question Blackstone’s historical 
analyses. Dolan, “Battered Women,” 256; Hartog, Man and Wife, 106, 108. However, Blackstone’s 
argument that coercion excused wives is generally accepted as the standard rule without further study. 
Peter King, “Female offenders,” 69; Beattie, “Criminality o f  Women,” 87; Shoemaker, Gender in English 
Society, 297.
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actions and when did criminal juries decide that she had acted under the direction of her 
husband and was therefore not liable for her actions? The law itself is unclear, and the 
cases are marked with inconsistencies. Judges and juries used discretion when 
interpreting and assigning responsibility to wives accused o f crime in the eighteenth 
century.
According to the principle of marital coercion, eighteenth-century judges and 
juries assumed that a wife committed a crime under her husband’s coercion if he was 
present when the act took place; therefore, she was not liable for her actions although a
1 ftOjury could find her husband guilty. In principle, if  a married woman could prove that 
her husband was present when she committed the crime, the jury had to acquit her.163 
However, as the cases in the Old Bailey show, the defence o f coercion was open to 
interpretation. Husbands often had to be both present and privy to the crime for the 
defence of coercion to apply. There are cases where the jury acquitted the husband while 
convicting his wife, or in some instances, judges and juries applying the defence of 
coercion even if the husband was not present. Cases were also resolved because o f other 
legal rules including lack of evidence, the absence o f the prosecutor, or even a fault in the 
indictment. Just because marital coercion existed in principle did not mean that it applied 
universally in practice.
How did marital coercion work in practice and how did coverture affect the 
criminal liability of married women? If coverture was the rule, as historians such as Peter
162 Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law , 53.
163 Notable for its legal dialogue, one can see this in the case o f  Susannah Clarke. It should be noted 
however, that Clarke’s case is unique in its dialogue and debate about the presence o f  her husband. A 
search in the O ld Bailey Sessions Papers also failed to find evidence o f  her husband being charged for the 
same crime. “Susannah, the wife o f  Edward Clarke, breaking the peace: riot, June 28th, 1780,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1780s/tl7800628-76.htm l> 
2005.
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King suggest, then married women accused of crimes could simply say that their 
husbands were present and the law would force the jury to acquit them.164 However, the 
records do not show married women directly appealing to the defence o f coercion, but 
rather show the judges and juries applying the defence of coercion. More often than not, 
married women accused of theft-related offences in association with their husbands 
claimed that they committed crimes out of want and starvation, very rarely did they argue 
the defence of coercion.165 This suggests that ordinary people were unaware of the 
intricacies o f coverture or did not trust its authority as a legal principle, and that it did not 
enjoy the widespread application that legal treatises attributed to it. And what about 
married women who committed crimes without their husbands? Would committing any 
sort of crime forfeit the benefits o f coverture, or did the courts treat married women 
differently than single women even if they were not directly acting with their husbands? 
One can illustrate married women’s criminal behaviour and the court’s treatment o f such 
women, including the defence of coercion, by examining the cases involving theft-related 
offences in the Old Bailey. Since coercion could excuse married women in theft-related 
offences, one would expect to find numerous acquittals of married women accused of 
such crimes. However, the Old Bailey records bear different results. While the court 
applied the defence o f coercion in some cases, it was neither universal nor did it excuse 
all married women from criminal liability. Hendrik Hartog argues that coverture was “a 
set of imaginary ‘facts’ created to achieve a legal result. It was a tool, not an explanation:
King, “Female offenders,” 69.
165 See for example: “Jane Johson, theft: receiving stolen goods, theft: receiving stolen goods, 19th May, 
1743,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey <http:www.oldbaileyonline.org/htm l_units/1749s/tl7430519- 
18.html> 2005; “William Bransgrove, Mary the wife o f  James Terry, theft: burglary, 26th April 1775,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey <http:www.oldbaileyonline.org/htm l_units/1770s/tl7750426-14.htm l> 2005.
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existing only for particular purposes, to be discarded when no longer useful.”166 In the 
case of marital coercion, coverture could only go so far and judges and juries often 
considered married women independent legal identities, as liable for their criminal 
actions as anyone else in eighteenth-century London.
How often did married women commit theft-related offences, what sorts of 
offences did they commit and how did the courts treat those accused of such crimes? 
There are 1,080 surviving cases involving married women accused of theft-related 
offences in the Old Bailey during the eighteenth century. O f the 1,080 cases with 
married women, 880 (81.5 percent) involved wives accused of crimes without their 
husbands. For this reason alone, one would not expect to find numerous examples of 
juries assuming coercion. However, 199 cases involved women accused o f committing 
theft-related offences with their husbands. Since the defence of coercion often depended 
on the presence o f a woman’s husband, cases involving women accused with their 
husbands will be examined separately from cases involving women accused without their 
husbands. One would not expect to find the application of coercion in cases without 
husbands; however, juries often used their discretion in applying the defence of coercion 
and the presence, or absence, of a woman’s husband did not always guarantee the 
interpretation of coercion according to the legal treatises.
Before examining the actual cases, it is important to understand a number of the 
terms used in, and to describe matters raised by, the court records. The term “theft-
166 Hartog, Man and Wife, 107. This contrasts with J.H. Baker’s argument that “no one was harmed by 
[legal] fictions, and they were only allowed where their operation was fair and the effect desirable in the 
eyes o f  the court.” J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, Fourth Edition (London: 
Butterworths Lexis N exis 2002), 202. The discussion o f  coverture in the Old Bailey demonstrates that 
coverture and the legal fiction o f  unity o f  person was definitely not “fair,” although their effects were 
desirable in the eyes o f  authorities.
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related offences” refers to a number o f different crimes, all of which were felonies. The 
most common form of theft was simple grand larceny, which was theft o f any item worth 
more than one shilling.167 Simple grand larceny was a clergyable offence, which meant 
that any man or woman convicted of it could plead benefit o f clergy and escape 
execution. After 1718, those who successfully pled clergy were sentenced to seven years 
transportation, which led to most judges simply sentencing offenders to transportation 
rather than execution. The second most common offence amongst married women was 
theft from a specified place, which was primarily concerned with the actions o f domestic 
servants. This theft was defined as: “theft from a dwelling house o f goods valued at more 
than forty shillings,” and became a nonclergyable offence in 1713.168 Receiving stolen 
goods, the third most common offence amongst married women, involved a person, often 
a pawnbroker, taking in goods he or she knew to be stolen and then selling them for a 
profit. Other theft-related offences included housebreaking, burglary, highway robbery, 
animal theft, robbery, pick pocketing, shoplifting, and the all encompassing “theft.”
Some of these crimes still exist and their definition has changed little since the eighteenth 
century.169
As previously discussed, the English legal system was harsh and the only 
punishment for felonies was hanging. In an attempt to lessen the severity o f the law, 
juries often delivered partial verdicts. These verdicts lessened the value o f the goods 
stolen, or lessened the offence in order for the offender to receive a lighter sentence. For
167 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), 181-182.
168 Ibid, 173; Paula Humfrey, “Female Servants and W omen’s Criminality in Early Eighteenth-Century 
London,” in Criminal Justice in the O ld  World and the New: Essays in Honour o f  J.M. Beattie, ed. Greg T. 
Smith, Allyson N. May, Simon Devereaux (Toronto, 1998), 73.
169 For a more in depth explanation o f  crimes prosecuted in the Old Bailey see: “Crimes Tried at the Old 
Bailey,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/historv/crime/crimes.html> 
2005.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
48
example, a jury could find a person accused of pickpocketing guilty o f stealing, but not 
from the person. This meant that the offender would still be punished, but he or she 
would not be hanged. Also common, especially with simple grand larceny and theft from 
a specified place, was the deliberate undervaluing of goods to fit within the statutes.
After 1718, the main secondary punishment was transportation to the colonies for seven 
years, but offenders who received partial verdicts were also whipped or branded. Partial 
verdicts ensured that offenders would be punished and other people deterred from crime, 
while making sure that the law did not lose its authority by appearing too harsh. The 
other two verdicts available to juries were “guilty” and “not guilty.”
Wives with Husbands 
The Old Bailey has 199 surviving cases involving married couples accused of 
theft-related offences together. Because of the rules o f coverture, one would expect to 
find the defence o f coercion applied in these cases, but this was not always the case in the 
records. Many people were unaware of the intricacies o f coverture, and women’s 
defences often resembled defences of men or single women, including poverty and a 
reliance on character witnesses.170 As Table 3.1 shows, the defence o f coercion was not 
applied consistently or universally. Only 58 (29.1 percent) cases involve the textbook 
application o f the defence o f coercion, where a husband was convicted while his wife 
was acquitted, while a rare group of cases actually involve the reverse. Juries found 13 
women (6.5 percent) guilty of theft-related offences while acquitting their husbands.
That is hardly the picture of coverture Blackstone portrays in his Commentaries, nor does 
it reflect the common historiographical argument that married women routinely escaped
170 Douglas Hay, “War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record o f  the English Courts,” 
Past and Present 95 (1982), 128; J.M. Beattie, “The Pattern o f  Crime in England, 1660-1800,” Past and 
Present 62 (1974), 85.
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conviction because of the defence of coercion. It is true that juries acquitted the majority 
o f married women accused of theft-related offences with their husbands; however, o f 
these cases, 103 involved acquittals for both spouses, which is over half the cases. 
Historians of crime do not argue that married men who were accused with their wives 
were treated more leniently than single men and married men accused without their 
wives; however, the Old Bailey demonstrates otherwise.
Table 3.1: Verdicts fo r  Wives Accused o f  Theft-Related Offences 






Husband Guilty 5 58 0 63
Husband Not Guilty 13 103 5 121
Husband Partial Verdict 0 15 0 15
Total 18 176 5 199
Source: Old Bailey Sessions Papers N=199
In the cases involving men, either unmarried or married without their wives, accused of 
theft-related offences, just over one-third resulted in acquittals. This contrasts with the 
almost two-thirds acquittal rate for married men accused with their wives.172 Perhaps this 
difference occurred because the jurors, many of whom would be on the Parish 
committees, were concerned with the effect that transportation or execution of a spouse 
and/or parent would have on the familial dependants, especially since the burden to 
provide for these families would fall on the local authorities.173 The presence of the 
spouse would emphasise the potential fallout on these dependants. However, the 
predominant view amongst historians has been that married women were less likely to be 
convicted when it was obvious that they had a family to support, which would then be
171 Partial verdict refers to a jury undervaluing the stolen goods or convicting the offender on a lesser 
offence.
172 O f the 35,959 cases involving males accused o f  theft-related offences, 12, 973 (36.1%) resulted in 
acquittals compared to the 121 acquittals out o f  199 cases (60.8%) involving men accused with their wives. 
The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org> 2005.
173 Beattie, Policing, 438.
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placed on parish relief.174 While this was obviously a concern of parish authorities, this
argument is not complete. Transporting or executing a husband would place the wife on
parish relief, as well as her family. This would have been especially troublesome since
widows were amongst the deserving poor and therefore entitled to relief.175 This
argument, combined with the finding that juries were more likely to acquit both spouses
accused of theft-related offences together, leads to the conclusion that coverture was not
necessarily a mitigating factor. A man accused with his wife received a more lenient
treatment than a man who was accused without his wife.176 This leads to the conclusion,
that marriage, not coverture led to juries treating offenders more leniently, but only when
the spouses were accused together.
The defence o f coercion still excused a number of married women from criminal
liability. One such case was that o f Richard and Ann Lindsey in 1721. James Gibbs
accused the Lindseys o f assaulting him and stealing some of his clothing. Gibbs met Ann
in Grays-Inn Lane, where she invited him to her house for some ale. Upon arriving
Gibbs claimed that Ann called
Dick; telling him he need not fear any thing, for Dick was but a Boy of 
6 Years of Age; but instead of such a Youth, her Husband, the Prisoner, 
came up, knockt him down, and held him, while she took his Shirt off his 
Back and rifled him, and that Ann Lindsey advised her Husband to cut his 
(the Prosecutor's) Throat.
Upon searching the Lindsey’s house, the prosecutor found the missing shirt. The jury
acquitted Ann because she committed her actions in the presence of her husband.
174 King, “Female offenders,” 70; Beattie, Policing, 444.
175 Barbara J. Todd, “Demographic determinism and female agency: the remarrying widow reconsidered ... 
again,” Continuity and Change 9:3 (1994), 421-422,427; Amy M. Froide, “Marital Status as a Category o f  
Difference: Singlewomen and Widows in Early Modem England,” in Singlewomen in the European Past, 
1250-1800, ed. Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 
1999), 252-254.
176 Although the term “w ife” referred to a woman’s status, one cannot search m en’s marital status in the 
Old Bailey.
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However, they did not believe that Richard was innocent and convicted him of a lesser 
offence, which carried the punishment of transportation rather than death by hanging.177 
Although Ann was involved in the crime, her subordinate and obedient position within 
the household ensured that she could receive one o f the benefits of coverture.
Almost one third of the cases involving married couples resulted in verdicts 
similar to that of Richard and Ann Lindsey, but judges and juries did not apply coverture 
consistently. As the 1720 case of Thomas and Ann Tompion shows, juries also 
recognized that a wife could be guilty of an offence while her husband was innocent, 
even when he was present at the event. Elizabeth Cole accused Thomas and Ann of 
stealing her purse while they were on a boat together. Elizabeth got on the boat and sat 
between Thomas and Ann, her purse being on Ann’s side. After Elizabeth got off the 
boat, she noticed that her purse was missing and began to make inquiries. In her search 
to find the pickpockets, Elizabeth was told that it must be the Tompions, but more 
specifically Arm since she “was reputed to be the most ingenious Pick-Pocket in 
London.” Although there was no doubt that Thomas was present at the time of the crime, 
it appeared that Ann actually took the purse. Since the initiative and action was all upon
177 “Richard Lindsey, Ann Lindsey, Theft with Violence: Robbery, 1st March, 1721,” The Proceedings o f  
the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1720s/t 17210301 -34.html> 2005. See also: 
“John Barret and Ann his wife, John Barret, theft: Simple Grand Larceny, 11th October, 1732,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey  < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/tl 732101 l-21.html> 
2005; “Robert Cook alias Hedgly, Margate his wife, Robert Cook alias Hedgly, Thomas Davis, Deborah 
Stent, theft: Burglary, 30th June, 1714,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1710s/tl7140630-41 ,html> 2005; “Robert Colson, Mary 
Colson, theft with violence: highway robbery, theft with violence: highway robbery, theft: receiving stolen 
goods, 11th September, 1734,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/t 1734091 l-33.html> 2005.
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Ann, the jury acquitted Thomas and convicted Ann, the judge later sentencing her to 
death.178
Juries often interpreted the defence o f coercion and determined how strictly to 
apply it in determining liability. In the case of James and Frances Emerton in 1732, it 
was unclear whether James was present at the time o f the theft, which would determine 
whether the jury could presume coercion. Robert Dawcett, the victim o f the robbery, 
claimed that Frances and another woman took him “to the White Horse in Chick Lane, 
and there, as soon as I laid my self upon the Bed, they [stripped] me by main Force, and 
took away my Money and my Watch.” James did not appear during this robbery, but 
stopped Robert at the door as he tried to escape. The day after the robbery, James 
“offer’d to make it up with [Robert], and said, [he] should have [his] Watch and every 
thing again, if  [he] would be but easy.” This suggests that James was aware of the crime, 
even if he did not approve of his wife’s actions. However, it neither suggests his 
presence at the crime nor his knowledge of it before or during its occurrence. This case is 
marked throughout with Frances’ colourful language. She claimed that Robert “call’d the 
Watch because I would not lie with him as well as t’other woman.” Juries in the 
eighteenth century took robbery cases very seriously as there was a great concern with 
violent theft-related offences. However, they considered this a masculine crime and the
178 “Thomas Tompion, Ann Tompion, Theft: Pick Pocketing, 12th October, 1720,” The Proceedings o f  the 
O ld Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1720s/tl 7201012-5.html> 2005. See also: 
“Christopher M ’Donald, Francis Farrel, John Roney, Alice Roney, Jonathan Parker, theft: simple grand 
larceny, theft: receiving stolen goods, theft: receiving stolen goods, theft: receiving stolen goods, 16th 
January, 1765,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17650116-35.html> 2005; “Martin Thompson, Patty 
Thompson, theft: specified place, theft: simple grand larceny, 15th May, 1771,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  
Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/tl7710515-24.htm l> 2005; “Sarah wife o f  
Thomas Painton, Thomas Painton, theft: simple grand larceny, theft: receiving stolen goods, 28th February, 
1759,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1750s/t 17590228- 
25.html> 2005.
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conviction rate for male offenders was much higher than that of female offenders. 
Whether for this reason or another, Frances feared that the jury would convict her 
husband, even though she “knew” he was innocent. She pleaded with the jury to “take it 
into Consideration; and do what you will with me let all Punishment be due to me, but 
clear my Husband; don’t hang him whatever you do.” Since it appeared that James was 
not present, and that Frances acted independently, the jury acquitted James. However, 
the plea for mercy also affected the outcome of the case as the jury delivered a partial 
verdict and sentenced Frances to transportation, rather than death, which was the 
punishment for robbery.179
The case of William and Sarah Northey in 1784 also shows how a judge or jury’s 
interpretation of the principle of coercion determined whether a woman deserved the 
benefit of coverture. In this case, the concern was about the husband’s knowledge. 
Thomas Flint accused the Northeys of shoplifting some lace edging from his store. The 
Northeys went into Flint’s shop and were looking at lace, when Sarah “took a card out of 
the box, and she said she would let it lay till she came to a card that she liked better.”
The store clerk soon missed the card and testified that he “saw the woman take it in her 
hand, and she seemed to put it under her stays, by her manner of shrinking herself up; it 
was the woman [the store clerk] saw, and not the man.” After leaving the shop, Flint and 
his clerk found the missing lace in William’s pocket. William testified that this was a
179 “James Emerton and Frances his wife: James Emerton, theft with violence: robbery, 5th July 1732,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey  < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/tl7320705-10.htm l> 
2005. See also: “William Brisbane, Jane Brisbane, theft: simple grand larceny, 29th October, 1783,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey  < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1780s/tl 7 8 3 1029-36.html> 
2005; “John Rowley, Elizabeth Rowley, theft: simple grand larceny, theft: receiving stolen goods, 15th 
January, 1778,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/t 17780115-53.html> 2005; “William Holland and 
Margaret his wife, William Holland, theft: simple grand larceny, 10th July, 1776,” The Proceedings o f  the 
O ld Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/t 17760710-37.html> 2005.
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simple misunderstanding: he had put the lace in his pocket after his wife said that she
wanted it because he thought he had paid for it with his other purchases. As soon as he
discovered that the lace had not been paid for, William offered to pay for it; however,
Flint “was determined to make an example of them, as [he suffered] daily” from
shoplifting. At the end o f the case, the judge explained to the jury that,
where a felony is committed by a married woman in the presence of her 
husband, she ought to be acquitted,. . . But if  you are of opinion that the wife 
stole it altogether without knowledge or privity of her husband, and he knew 
nothing at all o f it, then his being present will neither affect him, nor excuse her; 
and upon that supposition, if  you can be satisfied he knew nothing o f the fact at 
all, you should find the woman guilty and acquit the man: If you are doubtful 
whether either o f them stole this, you should acquit them both.
The jury believed that Sarah acted without the knowledge of her husband as they
convicted her o f a lesser offence and acquitted William. This, and the previous examples
of James and Frances Emerton and Thomas and Ann Tompion demonstrate that the
I 80principle o f coercion was open to interpretation.
Other considerations besides the principle of coercion often played a role in the 
assigning of guilt or innocence. As the 1757 case of John and Sarah Page shows, 
reputation played a large role injury deliberations. James Case charged John and Sarah 
with stealing a number of items from their lodging room. Case testified that he “took up 
the woman, who confessed she had pawn’d [the items] at several pawn brokers, where I 
went and found them pawn’d in her name. I have heard a very good character o f the
180 “William Northey, Sarah Northey, theft: shoplifting, 26th May, 1784,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  
Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/ 1780s/tl7840526-78.htm l> 2005. See also: “William  
Shepard, Elizabeth Shepard, theft, 15th October, 1729,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1720s/tl7291015-1 l.html> 2005; “Elizabeth Fisher, George 
Holden and Rebecca his wife, George Holden, theft: specified place, theft: receiving stolen goods, 3rd 
September, 1740,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/tl7400903- 19.html> 2005; “M iles Bame, and Anne his 
wife, otherwise Anne Warren, Miles Bame, theft: simple grand larceny, 15th January, 1767,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17670115-32.html> 
2005.
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man, but a very bad one o f the woman.” The pawnbrokers testified that Sarah pawned
the goods herself and that her husband was not present during these transactions.
However, Sarah testified that her “husband went along with [her], and [stayed] at the
doors while [she] pawned these things,” which suggests that he was both present and
privy. The principle o f coercion was relevant, yet Case seemed to believe that Sarah, not
John, committed the offence. Case answered the question “Did she say she pawn’d the
goods by the order of her husband?” with “No, she did not mention him.” Sarah did not
have a very good character. John’s nephew testified that he “would trust him with a
million of money if I had it, but to the woman she is very bad.” This testimony was very
important since it appears to have helped the jury determine whose story to believe. In
this case, the jury believed Sarah acted independently and convicted her of theft from a
1 8 1specified place while acquitting John.
The eighteenth-century criminal law was characterized by discretion, and crimes 
involving married couples were no exception. As previously illustrated, England had an 
incredibly harsh criminal law for which the chief punishment was death by hanging until 
1718. To lessen the severity of the law, English judges and juries exercised discretion, 
judging each case according to its merits and applying the law accordingly.182 The 
benefit of clergy, juries undervaluing stolen goods, and the system of pardons all worked 
together to lessen the severity o f the law and enabled authorities to use their discretion 
according to the merits of each individual case. Discretion was not limited to the
181 “John Page and Sarah his wife, theft: specified place, 7th December, 1757,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  
Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1750s/tl7 5 7 1207-7.html> 2005. See also: “Elisha 
Wormlayton, and Ann his wife, Elisha Wormlayton, theft: simple grand larceny, 1st April, 1761,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17610401 -16.html> 
2005.
182 Langbein, Adversary Criminal Trial, 6, 231, 336, 338, 343.
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criminal law, and its main strength was that it enabled the law and its discriminatory 
practices to “operate, adapt, and persist for so long without being seriously 
challenged.”183 As the previous cases show, jurors were discriminating in their decisions 
about whether to apply the principle of coercion. Jurors were willing to acquit wives if it 
was apparent that that they had acted within the parameters o f patriarchy, coverture and 
the prescribed feminine social roles. However, women who showed independence, 
especially in cases where it was clear that the wife had instigated the offence, were more 
likely to be convicted.184 An assumption of the principle of marital coercion was that a 
husband was responsible for his wife’s actions and should keep her under control.
Despite the concerns with upholding patriarchal authority, judges and juries saw 
independent wives rather than husbands as the problem. In cases o f clear female 
independence, judges and juries preferred to punish the wife for her crime rather than 
punish the husband for his failings as a patriarch. As long as married women were 
willing to live within their socially constructed, subordinate roles, they could expect to 
benefit from coverture; however, judges and juries, in common with society in general, 
were concerned with insubordinate women and did not grant such women the “benefits” 
of their sex.
Wives without Husbands
The defence o f coercion has led some historians to argue that the courts treated 
married women leniently and allowed them to escape conviction because o f the
183 Stretton, “Women, Property and Law,” 41; Stretton, “Married Women,” 126; Hay, “Property, Authority 
and the Criminal Law,”; Cynthia Herrup, The Common Peace: Participation and the Criminal Law in 
Seventeenth-Century England  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
184 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 414.
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presumption of coercion.185 However, there has been a lack of research into the actual
application of coverture in the criminal courts, with the exception of research into the
seemingly incompatible term of married spinsters.186 Within this debate, Valerie C.
Edwards argues that:
women were probably as aware of the possibilities o f the defence of 
marital coercion as men were of their much wider right of benefit of 
clergy. They perhaps pleaded it habitually and automatically as a last 
straw, whether entitled or not, just as illiterates pleaded benefit o f clergy 
in the hope of being able to recite the ‘neck verse’ with sufficient accuracy 
to convince the court.187
This suggests that married women were aware of the intricacies o f coverture and used it
to their advantage. As the Old Bailey cases involving married couples accused together
demonstrate, married women did not appeal to coverture as a defence. Instead, judges
and juries chose to apply the defence of coercion, and this decision depended on
individual circumstances. Married women could not rely on the defence of coercion to
excuse their criminal actions. In addition, the defence of coercion was only supposed to
apply if the husband was present and privy to the criminal action. Coercion was a limited
defence, and it was not supposed to be used in cases involving married women accused of
crimes without their husbands. It is important for all historians to remember that married
women often acted on their own and to discover how the courts treated those married
women to whom the defence o f coercion could not apply in principle.
185 One o f  the main proponents o f  this argument is Peter King, who discounts married women as 
unimportant when compared to the larger number o f  single female offenders, See: King, “Female 
Offenders,” 69.
186 Carol Z. Wiener, “Is a Spinster an Unmarried Woman?” American Journal o f  Legal H istory 20 (1976), 
27-31; J.H. Baker, “Male and Married Spinsters,” American Journal o f  Legal H istory 21:3 (1977), 255- 
259; Valerie C. Edwards, “The Case o f  the Married Spinster: An Alternative Explanation,” American  
Journal o f  Legal H istory 21:3 (1977), 260-265.
187 Edwards, “Married Spinster,” 264.
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Married women were more likely to be accused of crimes without their husbands 
than they were to be accused with their husbands. O f the 1,080 cases involving married 
women, 881 (81.6 percent) involved married women accused without their husbands. It 
is in these cases that one would not expect to find the presumption of coercion. Table 3.2 
shows the verdicts o f married women accused of crimes without their husbands, and the 
numbers are noticeably different from the numbers for married couples found in table 
3.1. These numbers detract from the argument that coverture benefited women and that 
the law treated married women more leniently than single women and men.
Table 3.2: Verdicts fo r  Wives Accused without their 
 Husbands in the Old Bailey, 1700-1799
Verdict Number Percentage
Guilty 278 31.60%
Not Guilty 433 49.10%
Partial Verdict 170 19.30%
Total 881 100.00%
Source: Old Elailey Sessions Papers
N=881
Juries acquitted under half of the married women accused without their husbands (49.1 
percent), which contrasts with the 88.4 percent acquittal rate for wives accused with their 
husbands found in table 3.1. The acquittal rate for single and widowed women was 44.0 
percent, which is quite similar to the acquittal rate for married women without their
| on
husbands (49.1 percent). This contrasts with the argument that the courts treated 
married women differently than single or widowed women. Even husbands involved 
with their wives received a higher acquittal rate (60.8 percent) than wives without 
husbands. These numbers indicate that one cannot assume that the defence of coercion 
excused all married women from criminal liability. Since eighteenth-century Londoners
188 O f the 17,702 theft-related offences involving single and widowed women, 7,818 received acquittals, 
5,404 were convicted and 4,540 received partial verdicts. The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org> 2005.
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were willing to prosecute married women, and jurors were willing to convict these 
women, it seems clear that eighteenth-century law and society did not expect a husband 
to be fully responsible for his wife’s actions. Little evidence exists o f a general 
unwillingness to assign criminal responsibility to married women accused of theft-related 
offences. The courts did not recognize coercion as an overarching defence; married 
women could and did expect to be convicted when they were accused of theft-related 
offences. The courts treated married women accused without their husbands similarly to 
single or widowed women. This further argues against the belief that judges and juries 
treated married women more leniently because o f coverture. In addition, the cases 
involving married women accused without their husbands seems to suggest that marriage 
was only a mitigating factor when couples were accused together in cases where the 
presumption of coercion was supposed to apply.
Despite the theoretical requirement of a husband’s presence, judges and juries 
sometimes applied the defence of coercion in cases involving married women accused 
without their husbands. In 1749, Henry Barnet accused Elizabeth More of stealing sheets, 
saucepans, a flat iron and a number o f other goods. The case contains little detail but it 
explains that the jury acquitted More because “she did it by the directions o f her
1 Q Q
husband.” Another similar case was that of Elizabeth Henley in 1785. John Collins 
accused Henley of stealing sheets, a flat iron and a copper teakettle from the lodging he 
had let to Henley and her husband. Henley testified that she pawned the goods because 
she was experiencing great poverty due to her husband’s illness. Both Collins and the 
pawnbroker testified to the same effect. However, the judge did not rely on the defence
189 “Elizabeth More, theft: simple grand larceny, 22nd February, 1749,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/tl 7490222-40.html> 2005.
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of poverty and instead instructed the jury “to judge whether she did this under the 
authority of her husband, if  you think so you will acquit her.” Whether for reasons of 
sympathy or for belief that Henley was only obeying her husband, the jury acquitted 
Henley.190 Both More and Henley’s experiences show that even in cases not involving a 
husband’s direct involvement, judges and juries were willing to use their discretion and 
apply the defence o f coercion. However, it is rare for the cases to even mention coercion 
if the husband is not also named in the indictment. More often than not, married women 
accused of theft-related offences relied on defences other than coercion.
The most common defence women relied on was poverty.191 In 1768, Cornelius 
Wardman accused Margaret Martin of stealing a coat, a waistcoat and a pair of stays. 
Martin lived in the same house as the Wardmans and upon returning to her house after an 
absence of three days, Mrs. Wardman noticed the items missing from a drawer. Mrs. 
Wardman took Martin up on suspicion and Martin confessed to the crime. She took Mrs. 
Wardman to the pawnbrokers where she had pawned the goods and the pawnbroker later 
testified that the goods came from Martin. In her defence, Martin claimed that she “was 
in necessity, [her] husband being in confinement, and [she] could not starve.” The jury 
considered this plea and delivered the partial verdict of theft under one shilling. As a 
result, Martin was whipped instead o f hanged.192 The defence of poverty or an
190 “Elizabeth Henley, theft: specified place, 14th September, 1785,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1780s/tl7850914-68.htm l> 2005. See also: “Elizabeth Prior, 
theft, 4th December, 1734,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/t 17341204-6.html> 2005.
191 As Dana Rabin explains, “the mention o f  the poor with madmen and idiots seems to acknowledge that 
the desperation o f  poverty may result in actions for which one should not be held accountable.” Dana Y. 
Rabin, Identity, Crime, and Legal Responsibility in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 87.
192 “Margaret w ife o f  Robert Martin, theft: simple grand larceny, 7th September, 1768,” The Proceedings o f  
the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/tl7680907-35.htm l> 2005. See also: 
“Hannah (wife o f  Richard) Hooper, theft: specified place, 25th October, 1786,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld
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emergency could also result in an acquittal, as the case o f Elizabeth Chatfield in 1766 
illustrates. Chatfield lived alone, since her husband had abandoned her two years before 
the theft occurred. John Vaughan accused Chatfield o f stealing “three flat irons, one iron 
poker, one pair o f iron tongs, one iron fire-shovel, one copper quart pot, one pewter 
bason, and one iron trevef ’ from the room which she had leased from him. Vaughan also 
testified that nothing had gone missing while Chatfield and her husband lived together.
In her defence, Chatfield claimed that she “did not take them in order to steal them, it was 
upon an emergency.” Her character witnesses testified that they did not believe the 
accusations and her employer Mr. Godfrey even claimed that if she was acquitted, he 
hoped she would come back to work for him. Accepting the defence o f temporary need, 
the jury acquitted Chatfield.193 Poverty could often mitigate or even excuse theft and 
married women, much like men, single women and widows, relied on this as a defence. 
Since more married women used the defence of poverty than the defence of coercion, it 
suggests that poverty was a much more reliable and effective defence than marital 
coercion.
Similar to married women accused o f theft-related offences with their husbands, 
married women without their husbands faced the same assumptions about acceptable 
behaviour in the courts. Judges and juries often reflected their intolerance of independent
Bailey  <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1780s/tl 7861025-6.html> 2005; “Sarah w ife o f  Charles 
Griffice, theft: specified place, 16th January, 1754,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1750s/tl7540116-13.htm l> 2005.
193 “Elizabeth Chatfield, theft: specified place, 3rd September, 1766,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/tl7660903-60.htm l> 2005. See also: “Mary, w ife o f  
Timothy Curtin, theft: specified place, 22nd October, 1760,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/tl7601022-26.htm l> 2005; “Elisabeth wife o f  William 
Freeman, theft: simple grand larceny, 9th April, 1755,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/tl7750409-l l.html> 2005; “Ann wife o f  John 
Cartwright, theft, 24th April, 1754,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1750s/t17540424-4 l.html> 2005.
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or unfeminine actions in their verdicts. Anne Burry acted outside the proper feminine 
roles in 1751 and suffered because o f her behaviour. Martha Elgar accused Burry o f 
assaulting her in a park near the king’s highway and stealing twelve shillings from her 
person. While Elgar was walking in St. James’s Park, “under the very shadow of the 
trees, a woman came up to [her], and took [her] by the hand, and demanded [her] money, 
in a very rough way.” The woman threatened Elgar that if  she did not deliver her money, 
the thief would “stave [her] brains out.” After this threat, the woman put her hand in 
Elgar’s pocket and upon finding nothing reached into her “bosom and took out twelve 
shillings.” When Elgar cried out “a young man came up, and said, what, Staffordshire 
Nan! I thought you had been in Newgate.” After the robbery, Elgar and her husband 
inquired around the market for Staffordshire Nan and discovered that she was in 
Bridewell. The Elgars went to Bridewell and asked for Staffordshire Nan. When Burry 
came to the gate, Elgar accused her of theft and Burry threw her pipe at Elgar through the 
grates. The jury found Burry guilty of highway robbery and sentenced her to death by 
hanging.194 Burry’s behaviour was hardly characteristic of proper feminine behaviour 
and the jury chose not to extend her leniency, as she showed no remorse and did not fit 
the patriarchal ideal.
A married woman could act in a more feminine manner, but by taking initiative in 
theft, she often forfeited the “benefits of her sex.” Mary Tremain and Martha Lomack
194 “Anne, wife o f  John Burry, theft with violence: highway robbery, 11* September, 1751,” The 
Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1750s/t 17510911 -22.html> 
2005. See also: “Mary Young, alias Jenny Diver, Elizabeth Davis, alias Catherine the wife o f  Henry 
Huggins, theft with violence: highway robbery, 16lh January, 1741,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/t 17410116-15.htm 1> 2005; “Mary Royan, Locklen 
Kelley, theft: housebreaking, 7th December, 1748,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/t 17481207-4l.html> 2005; “Richard Garrett, John 
Eddin, Frances Hall, otherwise Frances the wife o f  Joshua Hall, theft with violence: robbery, 13th April,
1774,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/t 17740413- 
12-1 l.html> 2005.
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both showed initiative in their criminal activities and the jury convicted them of lesser 
offences. John Par accused Tremain of stealing a silver watch from his pawnshop in 
1733. Tremain came to Par’s shop to retrieve a shirt, which she had pawned earlier.
Par’s servant went upstairs to get the shirt and after Tremain left the store, he noticed the 
watch that had been on the counter was missing. Upon searching in other pawnshops,
Par found the watch pledged in the name of Tremain and her husband. The presence of 
the husband’s name on the pledge suggests that it was likely that he was at least aware of 
the theft, but Mary stole the watch, not her husband.195 The jury did not believe 
Tremain’s husband was responsible for her actions in this case and convicted her o f theft 
under forty shillings and sentenced her to transportation.196 Like Tremain, Lomack 
herself committed the theft. John Lomas accused her o f stealing a two-quart pewter pot 
from his tavern in 1754. Elizabeth Cooley saw Lomack come into Lomas’s public house 
and take the pot from a bench where Lomas had left it. Cooley informed Lomas and he 
caught Lomack and found the pot in her petticoats. Lomack’s defence was that “she 
borrowed it to carry her husband some drink.” While Lomack was supposedly 
performing her proper domestic duties, she, not her husband, had taken the initiative to 
steal the pot. The jury therefore convicted her o f theft under one shilling and sentenced
195 Married women could not make contracts, which included pledging items, but cases exist where married 
women, not their husbands, pledged the items. Juries often determined that a wife had acted independently 
because stolen goods were pledged in her name. See for example: “Lewis Sanders and Jane his wife, alias 
Jane Norris, Lewis Sanders, theft: specified place, 12th December, 1787,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  
Bailey < http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1780s/t 17871212-64.html> 2005; “William Sheppard, 
Elizabeth Sheppard, theft, 15th October, 1729,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1720s/t 17291015-1 l.html> 2005.
196 “Mary the w ife o f  Peter Tremain, theft: specified place, 12th September, 1733,” The Proceedings o f  the 
O ld Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/tl7330912-l l.html> 2005. See also: “Ruth, 
wife o f  Quilt Arnold, theft: shoplifting, 16th October, 1723,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1720s/t 17231016-2.html> 2005; “Mary Deppenn, Mary the 
w ife o f  William Anderson, theft: specified place, 9th July, 1740,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/tl 7400709-8.html> 2005.
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her to transportation.197 By taking initiative, Lomack and Tremain acted outside o f their 
proper gender role and showed the jury that they did not deserve the defence o f coercion.
Assuming that married women escaped conviction because o f coverture ignores 
the experience o f married women accused without their husbands. It also assumes that 
coverture was the rule and that married women were the one group in England whom the 
law did not treat with discretion. Even in theory the defence of coercion could only 
excuse actions if a wife’s husband had been present and privy to the action. This meant 
that a wife accused without her husband was not supposed to receive the benefit of 
coverture. This often included cases where the wife claimed she was obeying her 
husband’s commands even though he was not present at the offence. As the cases of 
Elizabeth More and Elizabeth Henley show, the defence o f coercion was open to 
interpretation even if the husband was not present. Juries often used discretion in 
determining whether a husband commanding his wife to steal was enough to merit the 
presumption of coercion. However, these cases were exceptions, and more often than not 
married women accused without their husbands had to rely on other defences to excuse 
their theft-related offences. The most common defence was poverty, which showed some 
form of dependency. Both Elizabeth Chatfield’s and Margaret Martin’s husbands were 
absent, and these women had no one else to rely on to support themselves. They turned 
to theft in desperation and the jury considered this when deciding on a suitable verdict 
and sentence for their offences. Like married women accused with their husbands,
197 “Martha wife o f  Ralph Lomack, theft: simple grand larceny, 11th September, 1754,” The Proceedings o f  
the O ldB ailev  <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1750s/tl754091 l-6.html> 2005. See also: 
“Mary the w ife o f  William Mitchell, theft: simple grand larceny, 14th May, 1777,” The Proceedings o f  the 
O ld Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/tl 7770514-33.html> 2005; “Ann wife o f  
Joshua Richmond, theft: simple grand larceny, 23r February, 1763,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17630223-13 .html> 2005.
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married women alone were subject to presumptions about proper feminine behaviour. 
Those who showed initiative in their actions or acted outside of the proper gender roles 
did not receive any benefit of coverture, or any presumption of innocence. Married 
women accused of committing crimes, like women who appeared before other courts, had 
to emphasise their dependency and conformity to the proper gender roles in order to
198receive an acquittal.
Thieving Wives
Married women were much less likely than unmarried women to be accused of 
crime in the eighteenth century, although this does not mean that they were absent from 
the criminal record.199 Nor does it necessarily indicate that married women were less 
likely to commit crime than were single women. The eighteenth-century marriage rate 
was relatively low. Many married late, and as E.A. Wrigley argues, “where marriage is 
late, many never marry.”200 In early modem England, only around one third of women
701were actually married at any given time. Married women may appear in the criminal 
record less frequently than single and widowed women simply because there were less 
married women than single women. However, there are other possible explanations for 
why married women make up such small percentages in the criminal record. The dark
198 Dolan argues that in order for a woman to qualify for “battered woman syndrome” in today’s courts, she 
must emphasize her weakness and dependency. Dolan, “Battered Women,” 252-254. Candace Kruttschnitt 
found that women with more economic freedom (and therefore less social control) receive harsher 
sentences than women who are economically dependant and socially controlled. Candace Kruttschnitt, 
“Women, Crime and Dependency -  An Application o f  the Theory o f  Law,” Criminology 19:4 (1982), 498.
199 Peter King found that only 1/3 o f  offenders were married in the Old Bailey indictments while 3/5 o f  
offenders were single. Peter King, “Female offenders,” 69.
200 E.A. Wrigley, “Marriage, Fertility and Population Growth in Eighteenth-Century England,” in Marriage 
and Society: Studies in the Social H istory o f  M arriage, ed. R.B. Outhwaite (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1982), 149.
201 Anne Laurence, Women in England, 1550-1760: A Social History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1995), 41. This proportion o f  married women is similar to King’s finding about the proportion o f  married 
women in the Old Bailey, which suggests that married women accounted for 1/3 o f  accused offenders 
because they only accounted for 1/3 o f  the population.
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figure of unreported crime constantly challenges criminal historians. It was the decision 
of the individual victims whether to prosecute an offence. As John Beattie argues, crime 
“was made visible by the decisions of victims and magistrates who together selected the 
offences that would come to public attention from a much larger pool o f offending 
behaviour.” Individuals were often reluctant to bring forth cases, especially when the 
only available punishment was death. Both transportation as a secondary punishment and 
the extension of the benefit of clergy to women were designed to combat these problems 
by increasing the willingness of victims to prosecute, and of juries to convict, offenders.
It is therefore wrong to assume humanitarian motives for these measures.203 Decisions to 
prosecute often depended on the perceived level of crime at the time, the character o f the 
offender, the availability of other informal methods of punishment, and how well the 
prosecutor knew the offender. It is also possible that victims were reluctant to prosecute 
married women because o f the possible consequences for their families.
As the following figures show, the readiness to prosecute changed over the course 
o f the eighteenth century. One striking feature of the Old Bailey records is the pattern of 
married women’s crime in the eighteenth century. Figure 3.1 shows the pattern of 
accusations for theft-related offences against married women in the eighteenth century. 
Although crime increased during this period, there is a marked peak from the 1750s until 
the 1780s. The pattern in figure 3.1 is even more striking when it is compared with the 
pattern in figure 3.2, which shows the overall pattern of accusations for theft-related 
offences in the eighteenth-century Old Bailey. Figure 3.2 differs from 3.1 in that it does 
not have a marked peak, and the increase occurred from 1760 to 1780. The peak of
202 Beattie, Policing , 40.
203 Ibid, 3 1 8 ,3 2 1 ,4 3 5 .
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figure 3.2 occurs when the accusations against married women fell in the 1780s. Since 
the pattern of accusations for married women (figure 3.1) differs from the overall pattern 
(figure 3.2), the cause o f the increase clearly relates to the attitudes toward, and 
behaviours of, married women rather than with the character o f crime more generally.
Figure 3.1: Accusations against Married Women fo r  Theft-Related Offences 






1700- 1710- 1720- 1730- 1740- 1750- 1760- 1770- 1780- 1790- 
1709 1719 1729 1739 1749 1759 1769 1779 1789 1799
Year
Source: Old Bailey Sessions Papers N=l,080











1700- 1710- 1720- 1730- 1740- 1750- 1760- 1770- 1780- 1790- 
1709 1719 1729 1739 1749 1759 1769 1779 1789 1799
Year
Source: Old Bailey Sessions Papers N=53,757
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
68
Eighteenth-century England was a time of great change and instability, and 
nowhere was this instability greater than in London. London was the largest city in 
eighteenth-century Europe, containing ten percent of the population o f England and 
Wales.204 This high population was unique in that it did not increase through natural 
means; the death rate actually exceeded the birth rate. Population increased through
♦ 9fi5migration and the typical migrants were young and unattached. Londoners 
experienced a greater degree of freedom than their rural counterparts did. Authorities 
were concerned because the paternalism that characterized and enforced the social 
hierarchy in rural areas was absent in London and other forms of control were not as 
effective. Authorities were particularly worried about the increased freedom of women
0 0 f tin the capital, especially unmarried women. London provided a place for these women 
to live independently from husbands and fathers, which increased patriarchal concerns
9 0 7about the danger and irresistible sexual power o f women. In response to the perceived 
problem of lack o f social control, lawmakers increased the severity o f the law and came
90Sto rely on the legal system as the principal form o f control. This severity matches the 
finding about authorities punishing wives outside o f control instead of the failed 
patriarchal authority in accusations against married couples for theft-related offences. 
Changes in the prosecution and conviction levels were predicated on perceived changes 
in the conception of women and individual liability and personhood.
204 George Rude, Hanoverian London, 1714-1808 (Berkely: University o f  California Press, 1971), 5.
205 Ibid, 7.
206 Beattie, “Crime and Inequality,” 128, 129; Beattie, Policing, 64; Humfrey, “Female Servants,” 61.
207 Beattie, Policing, 64. Beattie also argues that “the prosecutions o f  large numbers o f  women ... helped to 
encourage a sense that society was changing in some important ways, that the natural feelings o f  deference 
and obedience that underlay social order were shifting, that the old controls that underpinned the cohesion 
o f  society were being undermined.” Beattie, “Crime and Inequality,” 128.
208 Kruttschnitt, “Women, Crime and Dependency,” 498. This punishment o f  females who challenged 
patriarchal authority rather than punishment o f  failed patriarchs is similar to the treatment o f  independent 
married women accused o f  theft-related offences with their husbands.
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As Beattie argues, the concern with single women centred on the lack of control 
and the increasing crime levels amongst single women during the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries.209 Contemporaries still saw marriage as a form of control. 
Since a wife was subordinate primarily to her husband, it was his responsibility to control 
her actions. Authorities sought to control the actions o f the husband and he in turn 
controlled the actions of his wife, at least theoretically. As Maeve Doggett argues, 
coverture enabled a husband to control his wife, through force if necessary, and it was 
this control, rather than the principle of unity, which was the essence o f coverture.210 
However, attitudes toward coverture and the unity of persons changed in the mid­
eighteenth century. As Susan Staves shows, from 1675 to 1778 equity courts were 
willing to recognize separate maintenance contracts, which meant that husband and wife 
were two separate persons. This practice changed after 1778 as the courts began to 
reassert the principle that husband and wife were one person before the law.211 It is 
probable that this change in conceptions of married women’s individuality and separate 
legal status also affected the criminal law, especially since Staves’ pattern reflects the 
pattern found in figure 3.1. From the mid-eighteenth century until the 1780s, there was a 
perception of wives as separate from their husbands. If wives had their own identity, 
coverture was not relevant or enforced and therefore a husband could not control his 
wife. This lack o f control scared authorities and potential victims o f crime who then
209 Beattie, Policing and Punishment, 40, 318.
210 Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law , 35.
211 Staves, M arried Women's Separate Property, 169, 175, 229-230. Interestingly, Dror Wahrman has also 
found this pattern in eighteenth-century culture. Dror Wahrman, “Percy's  Prologue: From Gender-Play to 
Gender-Panic in Eighteenth Century England,” Past and Present 159 (1998), 117, 121-123, 154-156; Dror 
Wahrman, “On Queen Bees and Being Queens: A Late-Eighteenth-Century ‘Cultural Revolution’?” in 
The Age o f  Cultural Revolutions: Britain and France, 1750-1820, ed. Colin Jones and Dror Wahrman 
(Berkely and Los Angeles: University o f  California Press, 2002), 267-270, 274-275, 280; Dror Wahrman, 
“Gender in Translation: How the English Wrote Their Juvenal, 1644-1815,” Representations 65 (1999), 21, 
29-31.
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came to rely on the criminal law and the gallows as the most effective form of controlling 
married women. As coverture was reasserted in the 1780s, there was less o f a need for 
control and prosecutions therefore fell. The benefits o f coverture only applied when a 
husband was able to control his wife. For this reason, one cannot argue that coverture 
made wives the favourites of the English law. Rather, it reinforced the gender hierarchy 
and the subordination of wives to husbands.
Marriage did not excuse wives from criminal responsibility in eighteenth-century 
London. The criminal justice system believed that although married women were 
entitled to the defence of coercion, it was up to the judge and jury to decide which cases 
merited this privilege. There were a number of exceptions to the principle o f coercion, 
all of which depended on the circumstances of the individual cases. Juries used 
discretion in all o f their decisions, including the decision of whether or not to apply the 
principles o f coverture when faced with married women accused of theft-related offences. 
The law qualified its legal fictions with loopholes, and coverture was not an exception to 
this rule. Coverture was not applied consistently throughout the eighteenth century and 
there were exceptions in both the criminal and the civil law. Juries appear to have 
convicted married women who acted outside of their prescribed gender roles and those 
who took independent initiative. It is the exceptions to the defence o f coercion that 
detract from the argument that coverture made married women the favourites of the 
English law. Coverture could explain why a married woman could not own property, or 
why she was not a person before the law, but it could not excuse her from all criminal 
responsibility. While historians must recognize that coverture existed in the criminal law,
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it must not be overstated and used to argue the leniency o f the law.212 Rather, coverture 
was yet another form o f control, which ultimately reinforced the gender hierarchy and 
patriarchal system of eighteenth-century London.
212 Walker, Crime, Gender and Social O rder, 75-76.
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C h a p t e r  4: M u r d e r in g  W iv e s  in  t h e  O l d  B a il e y
I f  they are so undiscerning as not to be able to perceive the 
essential Difference between obeying their Husbands in the 
Lord, and in the direct opposition to and Defiance o f  him; 
then let their blind Obedience to their Husbands excuse them 
in the Case o f  Treason as well as it does in other cases.
-Sarah Chapone, The hardships o f  the English laws in relation to 
wives, 1735
As the previous chapter illustrated, judges and juries were willing to treat married 
women as separate legal persons in theft-related offences, especially if they committed 
the crime without their husbands or showed independent initiative in their actions. 
However, even in theory the defence of coercion was only supposed to excuse certain 
offences. As Michael Dalton explained in 1618, “If a feme covert doth steale goodes by 
the compulsion o f her husband, this is no felonie in her. But if  by the compulsion of her 
husband, shee committeth murder, this is felonie in them both.”213 Even in theory, the 
law was only willing to let the excuse of coverture go so far and the previous chapter 
demonstrated that the defence of coercion was limited in practice. Judges and juries felt 
that married women who transgressed prescribed gender roles did not deserve the defence 
o f coercion. Only married women who conformed to the gender hierarchy could expect 
to receive the paternal benefits of coverture. But why were certain offences excluded? 
Garthine Walker explains that in the early modem period, “To wield violence was to 
assert authority and superiority.”214 Murder and killing were by definition violent 
offences, and women who committed such offences acted outside o f their proper gender 
roles. They asserted authority through their violent actions and denied their “natural” 
status as nurturers. Perhaps authorities believed that violent wives were outside the
213 Michael Dalton, The countrey ju stice conteyning the practise o f  the ju stices o f  the peace out o f  their 
sessions (London, 1618), 236.
214 Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order, 40.
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control of their husbands and therefore could not claim the defence o f coercion by the 
nature of their behaviour. On the other hand, perhaps authorities did not feel that wives 
could obey their husbands against the laws o f God. One other possible reason is that 
murder was such a serious offence that authorities did not believe it necessary to offer 
any possible defence that could excuse such heinous behaviour. Janelle Greenberg 
explains that authorities saw actions such as keeping a brothel, treason, and mala in se 
offences including murder “as so reprehensible that [a married woman] had to assume 
sole responsibility for her behaviour, even [if] it took place within the presence of her
9 I Shusband.” Even in theory the defence of coercion could not completely excuse 
married women from criminal responsibility. Murder was one of the most serious 
offences, and as such, it avoided the defence of coercion. It demonstrated a transgression 
of social and gender roles, and married women accused of murder received especially 
harsh treatment because of this extreme transgression. The treatment of married women 
accused of killing-related offences further weakens arguments about the law’s lenient 
treatment o f married women.
As Malcolm Gaskill explains, “Murder usurped God’s right to take life; 
symbolizing rebellion against providence, nature, authority and Christian society.”216 
However, there were different categories of killing and murder in eighteenth-century 
England. The most common of these was wilful murder. Sir Edward Coke defined 
murder as: “when a man of sound memory and o f the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth 
. . . any reasonable creature . . . with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party or
215 Greenberg, “The Legal Status o f  the English Woman,” 174. M ala in se  means “evil in itself.”
216 Malcolm Gaskill, Crime and Mentalities in Early M odern England  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 210.
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implied by law.”217 Murder differed from manslaughter in the presence o f malice 
aforethought. Sir Matthew Hale explained that “an intention of evil, though not against a 
particular person makes malice.”218 He further drew the distinction between murder, 
which was killing without provocation, and manslaughter, which was “killing another 
person upon a sudden falling out or provocation, or unjustifiable act.”219 Manslaughter 
was a clergyable offence, and an offender convicted of manslaughter was branded, 
whereas those convicted of murder were hanged. The purpose of the 1752 Murder Act 
was to increase the terror of execution and thereby deter more offenders. This Act held 
that those convicted of murder would be hanged within two days, and their bodies would 
be delivered to a surgeon to be dissected and anatomized.220 The two crimes of petty 
treason and infanticide directly targeted women’s behaviour. Petty treason was a 
“Manner o f Treason,. . . when a Servant slayeth his Master, or a Wife her Husband, or 
when a Man Secular or Religious slayeth his Prelate, to whom he oweth Faith and
• i
Obedience.” Although both men and women could commit petty treason, the majority 
o f those prosecuted for the offence were wives who murdered their husbands. Petty 
treason’s status as an aggravated form of murder meant that it carried a harsher sentence 
than wilful murder. Men convicted of petty treason were drawn on a hurdle to the place 
o f execution and hanged, while women convicted o f petty treason were burned at the 
stake, which was the same punishment applied to female high traitors. The law o f petty 
treason was an attempt to control the behaviour of married women by giving husbands
217 Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part o f  the Institutes o f  the Laws o f  England: Concerning High Treason, 
and other Pleas o f  the Crown, and Criminal Causes (London, 1671), 48.
218 Sir Matthew Hale, Pleas o f  the Crown (London, 1678), 36.
2'9 Ibid, 37, 46.
220 Statutes o f  the Realm, Volume 6, 604-605; Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 78-79.
221 The Statutes at Large, Volume I, 255.
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the same status as the king within the household.222 By contrast, the law o f infanticide 
was designed to control the behaviour and morality of unmarried women. In 1624, in an 
attempt to prevent fornication, Parliament passed a law against the murder o f bastard 
children. “This Act provided that a woman who concealed the death o f her bastard child 
was presumed to have murdered it unless she could prove by at least one witness that the 
child had been bom dead.”223 Infanticide was unique in that it reversed the traditional 
burden of proof. Rather than the accused being innocent until proven guilty, she was 
guilty unless she could prove otherwise. Even concealing the pregnancy meant that a 
woman was presumed to have committed infanticide if someone found her child’s body. 
Both petty treason and infanticide were directed almost exclusively at women, and they 
both carried harsh penalties. As such, one cannot argue that the law as a whole was 
guided by fundamentally chivalrous intentions. However, one must also examine the 
practice of the courts in determining the treatment of other categories o f offenders.
Women committed or were prosecuted for fewer crimes than men and murder was 
no exception. Including infanticide, there are 1,164 killing cases in the Old Bailey 
records. Of these, men were accused of committing 891 offences, just over three quarters 
o f the cases. Married women were accused o f the least offences at 78, with unmarried 
women accused of committing 195 offences. However, when one takes infanticide out of
0 0  Athe calculations, the numbers change, especially for unmarried women. Married
222 Ruth Campbell, “Sentence o f  Death by Burning for Women,” Journal o f  Legal H istory 5 (1984), 55.
223 Allyson N. May, ‘“ She at first denied it,’: Infanticide Trials at the Old Bailey,” in Women and History: 
Voices o f  Early Modern England, ed. Valerie Frith (Toronto: Coach House Press, 1995), 19.
224 Infanticide is generally taken out o f  murder statistics since it skews the results. Single women 
predominate in infanticide cases as the law was designed to combat their behaviour. However, the acquittal 
rates for infanticide were quite high in the eighteenth-century. Unmarried women were acquitted in 76.9%  
o f  infanticide cases and married women were acquitted in all but one o f  the fourteen infanticide cases 
before the Old Bailey. In addition, unlike almost every other offence, there was no possibility o f  a partial
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women were still accused of committing the least offences, 64, but unmarried women
were only accused o f committing 78 offences. The numbers for men remain the same.
Removing infanticide from the statistics also affects the acquittal rates as Tables 4.1 and
4.2 illustrate. What is striking about these two tables, however, is the differences in
acquittal and conviction rates between genders and women of different marital status.
Table 4.1: Verdicts in Killing Offences, including Infanticide, 






Guilty 20.50% 21.00% 22.10% 21.80%
Not Guilty 56.40% 71.80% 44.10% 49.60%
Partial Verdict 21.80% 6.20% 33.10% 27.80%
Special Verdict 1.30% 1.00% 0.80% 0.80%
Source: Old Bailey Sessions Papers
As Table 4.1 shows, even with infanticide included, married women received convictions 
in 20.5 percent o f the cases. All the other conviction rates are similar, with the highest 
being that of males, at 22.1 percent. While juries acquitted just over a half the married 
women in cases including infanticide, unmarried women received more acquittals (71.8 
percent). Juries acquitted men in just under half o f the cases, (44.1 percent) which is 
quite similar to the acquittal rate for married women (56.4 percent). However, men
99  Sreceived more partial verdicts than married and single women combined. Men 
received partial verdicts in 33.1 percent of their cases while married women’s rate was 
21.8 percent and single women only received partial verdicts in 6.2 percent of their 
accusations. Since partial verdicts generally carried the sentence o f branding instead of 
death by hanging for a full conviction, these numbers are particularly striking. They
verdict for infanticide. Therefore, historians look at both killing with infanticide and killing without 
infanticide.
225 The partial verdict for murder was manslaughter, and as Walker points out, manslaughter was a 
masculine form o f homicide. According to legal and societal understandings, both slayer and victim had to 
be grown men for a killing to be considered manslaughter. Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order, 124.
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suggest that judges and juries treated murderers similarly despite their gender, except
when delivering partial verdicts.
Table 4.2: Verdicts in Killing Offences, not including 






Guilty 23.40% 19.20% 22.10% 22.00%
Not Guilty 48.40% 64.10% 44.10% 45.90%
Partial Verdict 26.60% 15.40% 33.10% 31.40%
Special Verdict 1.60% 1.30%l 0.80% 0.80%
Source: Old Bailey Sessions Papers
Just as removing infanticide from the killing statistics drastically changes the 
number of unmarried women accused, so too does it affect the acquittal and conviction 
rates and their corresponding statistics. Table 4.2 illustrates the conviction and acquittal 
patterns according to gender and female marital status. Without infanticide, married 
women received the highest percentage of convictions (23.4 percent), which even went 
above the overall conviction rate o f 22 percent. However, the conviction rates are similar 
between the different categories. Unmarried women had the highest acquittal rate (64.1 
percent) while men (44.1 percent) and married women (48.4 percent) were very similar, 
with only a 4.3 percent difference. Just as before, men received more partial verdicts 
(33.1 percent) than married and unmarried women did. Only 15.4 percent o f unmarried 
women’s verdicts were partial verdicts, while married women received partial verdicts in 
26.6 percent of the cases. These statistics reinforce the conclusions drawn from the cases 
including infanticide found in table 4.1. Unmarried women received the most lenient 
treatment in killing offences, even when infanticide is not included, and juries treated 
married women and men relatively the same, despite men being accused of committing 
more offences. These findings do not support the assertion that juries treated women
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more leniently than they treated men. They also argue against Robert Shoemaker’s
argument that juries convicted fewer women because they felt that there was less need for
226deterrence. In fact, the higher conviction rate for married women illustrates that 
people perceived murdering wives as so far outside o f the gender order and patriarchal 
control that there was a definite need for deterrence through the gallows. An act so 
heinous as murder did not deserve the benefits of coverture since it completely removed 
all forms of paternal control. Coercion did not provide a defence in a charge against 
killing and marriage did not seem to provide a more lenient treatment for murdering 
wives.
The only exception to the lack o f leniency on the part of married women was the 
crime of infanticide. As Allyson May argues, married women “suspected of killing a 
child at or soon after its birth would have been charged with the common-law offence of 
murder,” since the 1624 statute specifically targeted single mothers.227 Part o f the crime 
was concealing pregnancy, which a married woman would likely not have done. Since 
infanticide targeted bastards, not legitimate children, marital status could excuse a 
woman from conviction. In 1704, Mary Tudor was accused o f murdering her female 
infant bastard “by throwing the same into a House or Office, whereby it was choaked and 
strangled.” In her defence, Tudor “called a Witness to prove that she was Married, and 
that the Child was no Bastard.” Tudor’s marital defence appears to have resonated with
9 9 8the jury as they acquitted her of the charges. Another similar case was that of Martha
Shackleton in 1743. Shackleton “was indicted for the Murder o f her Female Bastard
226 Shoemaker, Gender in English Society, 297.
227 May ‘“ She at first denied it’”, 19.
228 “Mary Tudor, killing : infanticide, 8th March, 1704,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1700s/tl7040308-30.htm l> 2005.
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Child, by casting and throwing it into a Privy belonging to the Dwelling-House of 
William Porter, wherein by Reason of the Filth and Excrement the said Child was 
choaked and suffocated, and thereof instantly died.” Both William Porter and his wife, 
Shackleton’s employers, suspected that she was pregnant. After receiving a letter from 
his wife and observing Shackleton’s strange behaviour, William had the vault of the 
necessary house opened. Upon opening, he discovered the remains o f an infant. The 
surgeon, Joseph Warner, deposed that since the child had lain in the soil for some time, 
he was unable to judge whether the child was either full term or if there had been any 
violence done to the infant. The court then asked Shackleton if she was married, to 
which she replied, “Yes - My Husband is at Sea, his Name is Hill.” The jury acquitted 
Shackleton when they heard that she was married.229
Perhaps because o f cases like Tudor and Shackleton’s, unmarried women thought 
to argue they were married in order to escape conviction. If they did not give birth to a 
bastard they could not be convicted of concealing their pregnancy and murdering their 
child. In 1746, perhaps out of shame and perhaps out o f an attempt to escape conviction, 
Mary Hope lied about her marital status. Hope was accused of wrapping her infant child 
in an apron and putting him in a box where he suffocated. Hope had felt ill and went 
upstairs in the house where she was working and residing. She did not want anyone with 
her, although others testified that they heard a great deal of noise from her room.
William Aget, Hope’s master, testified that he sent his wife and another servant up to the
229 “Martha Shackleton, otherwise Hill, killing: infanticide, 7th December 1743,” The Proceedings o f  the 
O ld Bailey<  http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/t 17431207-36.html> 2005. See also:
“Diana Parker, killing: infanticide, 17th September 1794,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
< http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1790s/tl7940917-46> 2005; “Hannah Bradford, killing: 
infanticide, 19th April 1732,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/tl7320419-15.html> 2005.
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room where “they saw what they thought was sufficient to convince them that there had
been a Labour or something like it.” Mrs. Aget and her servant searched for the body and
upon finding a locked box, Hope made such a fuss that they opened the box and found
the body of a male infant. Richard Wheatland, the constable, asked Hope, “good Woman
are you married?” to which Hope replied “yes.” Wheatland then asked her if she had
made any provisions for the child and upon answering no, Wheatland became more
suspicious. He testified that:
it was surprising to me that a married Woman should suffer herself to 
bring a Child into the World and have nothing to put it in; tell me the 
Truth I says, are you married or not? she crying still, said at last she 
was not; I then ask'd her again, have you nothing at all made for this 
Child, no Linnen whatsoever? none at all she said: I ask'd her who was 
the Father o f the Child; she said a Sailor. I ask'd her what was become 
of him, she said he was gone to Sea:
Despite these circumstances, Hope was acquitted because there were no marks of
violence on the body and the midwife could not testify whether the child had been bom
n i A
alive or was a stillborn. More often than not, women relied on other means of 
defending themselves when accused of infanticide, such as producing clothing they had 
made for the baby. However, infanticide was the one crime in which married women 
received a more lenient treatment, as the law was not designed to monitor their 
behaviour.
Table 4.3 illustrates the different verdicts according to crime for married women 
in the Old Bailey. Married women were mainly prosecuted for murder, as defined by the 
statute, infanticide and petty treason. Only one married woman accused of infanticide 
received a guilty verdict. For murder, the conviction and acquittal rates reflect the
230 Mary Hope, killing: infanticide, 15th October 1746,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/tl 7461015-23.html> 2005.
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percentages found in the previous tables. However, petty treason received more guilty 
verdicts than not guilty verdicts, which was unique among all murders prosecuted in the 
eighteenth-century Old Bailey.231 Unlike the law o f infanticide, which was directed at 
the behaviour o f single women, petty treason attempted to control the behaviour of 
married women and other subordinates. As Frances Dolan explains, “the murderous wife 
calls into question the legal conception of wife as subsumed by her husband and largely 
incapable of legal or moral agency.”232 In addition, Walker argues that the most 
dangerous sort of woman was one who “subverted household, social and moral order.”233 
Feminine violence of any sort towards men, even in self-defence, upset the gender order, 
and petty treason was the extreme example of such violence, since it went against a 
husband’s direct authority and higher status within marriage.234 When a subordinate such 
as a wife murdered her superior husband, she took power for herself and completely 
reversed the gender order. As Dolan and Ruth Campbell explain, the punishment of 
death by burning, which was the same for women convicted of high treason, both equated 
the husband with the monarch and provided an intimitadory symbol designed to maintain 
the subjection of subordinate women.235 Therefore, it is not surprising that the conviction 
rate is high for such offences. Petty traitors demonstrated that coverture and the 
principals of the gender order could not control their behaviour. Therefore the courts, 
through the law of petty treason, stepped in to enforce the gender order and maintain the 
household hierarchy.
231 In most murder cases, juries delivered more “not gulty” verdicts than “guilty” verdicts (see tables 1 and 
2). However, petty treason was the exception to the rule as table 3 illustrates.
232 Frances E. Dolan, “Home-Rebels and House-Traitors: Murderous Wives in Early Modem England,”
Yale Journal o f  Law and the Humanities 4 (1992), 3.
233 Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order, 83.
234 Ibid, 49.
235 Dolan, “Home-Rebels and House-Traitors,” 4; Campbell, “Sentence o f  Death by Burning for Women,” 
55.
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Table 4.3: Verdict According to Crime in Cases o f  Married Women Accused
o f  Killing Offences in the Old Bailey, 1700-1800
Guilty Not Guilty Partial Verdict Special Verdict
T o ta l
Infanticide 1 13 0 0 14
Murder 10 24 14 0 48
Petty Treason 5 4 3 0 12
Manslaughter 0 1 0 1 2
Killing 0 2 0 0 2
T o ta l
16 44 17 1 78
Source: Old Bailey Sessions Papers Sl=78
In 1737, Ann Mudd stood before the Old Bailey accused of stabbing her husband, 
Thomas Mudd, in the back. John Owen testified that he was in the cellar with Ann and 
her mother when Thomas started to come down the stairs. Ann then struck Thomas and 
he bid her to be quiet. “She had a knife by her side, which she pull’d out and clapp’d it 
down on a cupboard,. . .  then, as he stood upon the 3d step she struck him again in the 
face, and he bid her be quiet.” Upon Ann’s third slap, Thomas attempted to restrain her. 
Ann then “went to the cupboard where she had laid the knife, and hurl’d something at 
him.” Owen could not identify the object, but when Ann went to Thomas, “he 
immediately cry’d out, O Lord! I am stabb’d.” Elizabeth Aggleton testified to the same 
events. When the constable and Justice of the Peace asked Ann why she stabbed her 
husband, she said that she “stabb’d him in the back with a knife, for funn.” Ann had 
nothing to say in her defence and the jury found her guilty.236 Ann’s actions did not 
typify those of a subordinate wife. She both instigated the offence and attacked without 
provocation. In a similar case from 1773, Elizabeth Herring also stabbed her husband,
236 “Ann Mudd, killing: petty treason, 20th April 1737,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/ 1730s/tl7370420-6.htm l> 2005.
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Robert, without apparent provocation. John Boyle testified that he was in a pub with the
Herrings, when Elizabeth started arguing with Robert about bread. Elizabeth
had a knife in her hand picking a bone; in the space o f two or three minutes, 
she went up to her husband; [Boyle] though she was going to give him a 
lick with her hand; instead o f which she struck the knife into his throat; the 
blood immediately spouted out as if  a butcher had killed a pig.
Boyle also testified that the only word of a quarrel he heard between Elizabeth and
Robert, was the argument about the bread. Hannah Darling also saw Elizabeth stab
Robert after exchanging a few words and testified that she heard Elizabeth say “she
would spill his blood, and be hanged for him.” Elizabeth testified to relentless abuse at
Robert’s hands. At Darling’s, Elizabeth said Robert threw a pipe in her face, and when
she went to another box he threw a pint o f beer in her face. She “had a pennyworth of
beer in one hand and the knife in the other; [she] threw the knife at him, which proved
fatal.” Although Elizabeth claimed provocation, other witnesses did not see the events
she described. The jury found Elizabeth guilty of petty treason and sentenced her to
death by burning.
Both Elizabeth Herring and Ann Mudd acted outside o f prescribed gender roles 
by attacking their husbands. Despite allegations o f abuse, Elizabeth and Ann were not 
justified in attacking their husbands. As Walker explains, “Male violence was sanctioned
7^8to uphold order, female violence subverted it.” By their violent actions against a 
superior, Elizabeth and Ann subverted the gender order. As such, the law sought to 
restrain and punish their actions. The case of Elizabeth Fisher in 1714 further illustrates
237 “Elizabeth Herring, killing: petty treason, 8th September 1773,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1770s/tl 7730908-6.html> 2005. See also: “Joyce Hodgkis, 
killing: petty treason, 8th September 1714,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1710s/tl7140908-35.htm l> 2005; “Susannah Broom, killing: 
petty treason, 5th December 1739,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1730s/t 17391205-2.html> 2005.
238 Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order, 140.
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that unlike murder cases, provocation was not an acceptable defence for petty treason. 
Elizabeth “was indicted for the murther of her husband Will. Fisher, by giving him a 
mortal wound with a knife on the right side of his body ,. . . on the 21st of Ju ly .. .  of 
which he languish’d till the 8th of August, and then dy’d.” While under care before he 
died, Will claimed that he had offered Elizabeth provocation by misusing and beating 
her. He said that he was beating Elizabeth when she grabbed a knife and attempted to cut 
his boots and “in the scuffle the knife struck him in the breast.” Elizabeth’s actions 
appeared to be accidental. However, the jury did not acquit Elizabeth because of the 
provocation or apparent accidental nature o f the stabbing. Rather it was because o f the 
surgeons’ testimony as to the cause of Will’s death. Two surgeons deposed that “he did 
not die of the wound, for that it had not penetrated the trunk o f the body, and that he had 
been an infirm man for a great while before.”239 Provocation could not excuse a wife’s 
violence against her husband. Judges and juries treated married women accused of petty 
treason harshly because they demonstrated that they were completely outside of men’s 
control. Their actions totally upset the gender order, and as such received high 
conviction rates and harsh punishments.
Even though perceived as less serious than petty treason, wilful murder was still a
serious offence. Over half o f the accusations for killing-related offences against married
women were for murder. Juries treated married women accused of murder as
independent legal persons. These women faced the full force of the law when juries
239 “Elizabeth Fisher, killing: petty treason, 8th September 1714,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/171 Os/t 17140908-41 .html> 2005. It is possible that the 
surgeons testified that Will did not die because o f  Elizabeth’s actions since they saw the stabbing as 
justifiable homicide. However, it is impossible to tell the surgeons’ motives from the records. See also: 
“Lydia Adler, killing: petty treason, 28‘ July 1744,”
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/tl7440728-23,html> 2005; “Anne Williams, killing: 
petty treason, 9th September 1747,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey<  
http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1740s/t 17470909-21 ,html> 2005.
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delivered their verdicts and judges delivered punishments. Like theft, the majority of 
murder cases involved wives alone. The presence or absence of a husband was not even 
important in theory since the presumption of coercion was unavailable for killing-related 
offences. However, a very small minority were accused of murder with their 
husbands.240 One such case was that of Esther and Archibald Levingston in 1763. Esther 
was the principal in this case, whereas Archibald was indicted for “aiding, assisting, 
abetting, comforting, and maintaining her to commit the said murder.” John Dent 
testified that upon coming home one day, the neighbourhood was in a great confusion 
and its inhabitants “said they could not sleep in their beds, for [Esther] had said, she 
would kill some of the women and set fire to the neighbourhood afterwards.” She had 
also assaulted Mrs. Ashby who “lay bleeding on the ground” when Dent arrived home. 
The neighbours agreed that Esther needed to be secured and Dent went for the constable. 
Upon his return, Dent found that Esther and Archibald had locked themselves in their 
room. Matthew Lemond, the constable, testified that he tried talking to the Levingstons 
through the door and the more he “endeavoured to perswade her to govern her passion, 
the more outragious she grew, and both her husband and she declared the first that 
entered the room they would kill them.” Lemond, Dent, and a group of men attempted to 
break down the door to secure Esther. When the door opened a little bit, one o f the men 
attempted to reach in and Lemond said he “saw a woman’s arm and hand come out,” at 
which Peter Dove immediately cried out “I am stabbed.” John Chesney, who was also 
attempting to secure Esther, testified that when the door opened, “the first [he] saw was 
the man with his right hand on the door, he had a pair of tongs, or a poker, in his hand 
which he held up, it was iron: the woman immediately rushed her arm and head out and
240 Only four cases involved married couples accused together.
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stabbed the deceased.” Dove died from his wounds two days later. While both Esther
and Archibald were involved, Esther was the one who stabbed Dove. As a result, the jury
convicted her and she was sentenced “to be executed on the Monday following, and her
body dissected and anatomized.” Archibald could not deny his involvement but the jury
found him guilty o f manslaughter, for which he was branded.241
Another case involving a married couple became justifiable homicide, as the jury
accepted that provocation given to the husband justified his and his wife’s actions. In
1792, Samuel Taylor stood before the Old Bailey charged with murdering Thomas
Partridge and his wife Jane Taylor with aiding and abetting the murder. Sarah Horton,
Thomas Partridge and Erasmus Gregory were walking in Catharine-wheel alley when
they came across the prisoners. Horton testified that “Samuel Taylor and his wife made
use of several scandalous expressions . . .  and damned and blasted several times, and
many bad expressions.” Gregory took exception to these words, and when his friends
turned around, he was having words with Samuel. Sarah Horton testified that:
Partridge directly ran back, and I followed him; and by the time I got 
up with Samuel Partridge, he was down on the ground, and Taylor flat 
upon Partridge. I did not see any blows pass; Partridge was striving to 
get up; Jane Taylor was close by; and I heard Jane Taylor say, Damn 
him, stab him; and she repeated it seven or eight times over as they both 
of them lay on the ground.
All three left the area, but Partridge did not feel well. He was ill for some time, and,
according to the surgeon, “he never in my judgment recovered from the injury he
received; and I am obliged to say, that I have no doubt but he died o f the wound he first
241 “Esther Levingston, Archibald her husband, killing: murder, 14th September, 1763,” The Proceedings o f  
the O ld  Bailey <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/tl 76230914-59.html.> 2005. See also: 
“James Brownrigg, Elizabeth his wife, John their son, killing: murder, killing: murder, 9th September 
1767,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey  <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17670909- 
l.html> 2005.
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received.” Samuel justified his actions by explaining that Partridge and Gregory both 
offered provocation. As the Taylors were walking “arm in arm,” Partridge “said, Cobler, 
are you going to light your wife home? Says I, mind your own wife. With that Gregory 
came, and struck me.” The jury weighed the evidence, and found them both guilty of 
manslaughter. They were sentenced to twelve months in prison and each fined one 
shilling.242
By definition violent behaviour transgressed proper gender roles; however, 
women could act further outside their gender roles by the types o f murder they 
committed. This included petty treason for married women and infanticide for 
unmarried women, but also included other unnatural acts such as violence against 
children, which went against proper maternal behaviour. In 1751, Rachel Beacham was 
charged with the murder of Henrietta Dawes, who was six years old. Mary Hyde, 
Henrietta’s mother, left her with Beacham while she went to get coal. Hyde was only 
gone half an hour when Isabella Pollard ran to get her. Pollard had heard that Henrietta 
had been murdered, and immediately thought of Hyde. Upon returning to Beacham’s 
lodgings, Pollard and Hyde saw Beacham “rubbing her hands all over bloody.” They 
went up to her room and saw Henrietta’s body “lying in all its gore upon the floor.” 
Pollard testified that the body was “cut from ear to ear.” Beacham’s defence was that 
“she was tempted to do it,” but she did not specify how tempted. This was an apparent 
act o f murder, and transgressed proper feminine maternal roles by murdering a child for 
no apparent reason. It is probable that the jury would have convicted Beacham regardless
242 “Samuel Taylor, Jane Taylor, otherwise Morgan, killing: murder, 13th January, 1792,” The Proceedings 
o f  the O ld Bailey, <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/ 1790s/t 17920113-53.html> 2005. Because 
o f  coverture it was impossible to fine a wife since she had no property o f  her own. However, the fine in 
this case suggests that the judge and jury saw Jane completely separate from Samuel because o f  her 
participation in the murder.
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of Henrietta’s age. This crime seems abhorrent enough despite being committed against 
a child. Whatever the reasons, the jury found Beacham guilty and sentenced her to 
death.243
A contrasting case was that of Mary Hinds in 1761. Hinds was accused of 
throwing Edward Mulby, a five-month-old infant, into a pond and thereby drowning him. 
Sarah Mulby, Edward’s mother, testified that Hinds “was going to see her brother-in-law 
. . .  [and] she took my child (being seemingly fond of it), and said she would be gone half 
and hour.” When Hinds did not return, Sarah became frightened and “inquired about the 
streets, workhouses, and hospitals.” She found Edward’s body three days later “at Saint 
George’s Hospital; [and] it looked as if it had been drowned.” Sarah did not see Hinds 
for another four months. In her defence, Hinds testified that she “stopped upon the 
bridge in the park [at Kensington], and suddenly the child gave a spring into the river.” 
She tried to get him from the river but was unable to because she was pregnant. She did 
not return to Sarah because she was scared, although she later regretted that decision.
The jury weighed the evidence and determined that since this was an accidental death, 
Mary Hinds was innocent.244 Both Mary Hinds and Sarah Beacham’s cases involved 
children, but only Beacham’s appeared to have transgressed acceptable behaviour. As 
such, she suffered the penalty o f the law.
243 “Rachel wife o f  Joseph Beacham, killing: murder, 4th December, 1751,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  
Bailey, <http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/175Os/t 17511204-21.html> 2005.
244 “Mary the wife o f  John Hinds, killing: murder, 9th December, 1761,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld  Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17611209-26.html> 2005. Interestingly, Mary Hinds 
was later indicted for almost exactly the same crime seven years later. This time, however, the jury found 
her guilty and sentenced her to death and dissection. “Mary the wife o f  John Hindes, otherwise Mary 
Jones, killing: murder, 18th May, 1768,” The Proceedings o f  the O ld Bailey 
<http://www.oldbailevonline.org/html units/1760s/t 17680518-39.htm 1> 2005.
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Figure 4.1: Accusations against Married Women fo r  Killing-Related Offences in 
the Old Bailey, 1700-1799
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Similar to married women accused of theft, married women accused o f murder 
faced conviction if they transgressed proper gender roles of submission and obedience, 
which murder did by its violent nature. Unlike theft however, married women accused of 
murder could not expect to have their actions excused because of coverture and the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
defence of coercion. In addition, the pattern o f murder accusations differs from the 
pattern of theft accusations seen in the previous chapter. Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of 
murder accusations for married women in eighteenth-century England. There is a 
noticeable drop in the 1780s, which is similar to the pattern in figure 3.1 for married 
women’s theft-related offences. However, this trend is reversed in the 1790s. This 
confirms that the treatment o f married women accused of killing-related offences differed 
from the treatment o f married women accused of theft-related offences. Since people 
always considered murder a heinous offence, treatment o f married female murderers 
should not follow the pattern outlined in table 3.1. In addition, the pattern of married 
female murderers differs from the pattern outlined in figure 4.2. Unlike the variations in 
figure 4.1, figure 4.2 seems to follow a more definite pattern. Both unmarried women’s 
murder accusation rates and men’s murder accusation rates conform to the pattern found 
in figure 4.2. This shows that juries treated married women differently than both men 
and single women, as this chapter has shown.
Murder transgressed the bounds of proper feminine behaviour. Although all 
murders were unacceptable, masculine violence was more acceptable than feminine 
violence. Feminine violence, especially when directed at men, upset the gender order and 
transgressed proper gender roles. Violence suggested a form of autonomy and assertion 
which was not typical of prescribed feminine behaviour. Killing was the extreme 
expression o f violence, and women who killed, especially married women, suggested by 
their actions that they were outside o f male control. Just as with the theft-related 
offences, wives who were outside of their husbands’ control deserved to bear the full 
force o f the law. Although the defence of coercion did not excuse any form of killing,
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the treatment o f married women accused o f killing-related offences was similar to those 
involved in theft-related offences, where coercion was an available defence. Neither 
married women who killed, nor married women who took the initiative in theft-related 
offences, received any leniency before the law regardless o f their marital status. In 
addition, judges and juries treated married women who committed crimes that explicitly 
transgressed the gender hierarchy more harshly than those who did not. One only has to 
compare the conviction rates for petty treason and infanticide to see that transgressing 
gender boundaries and upsetting the patriarchal order was an inherent concern to all 
authorities. However, authorities were more concerned with hierarchy than with proper 
gender roles when it came to married women accused of killing-related offences. The 
ideal woman was maternal, and infanticide goes completely against all maternal instincts 
and proper maternal behaviour. The law of infanticide was classified with the murder of 
bastard, not legitimate, children. As such, the acquittal rate for married women accused 
o f infanticide was almost 100 percent. The only example of leniency towards married 
women accused of killing-related offences was infanticide. In contrast, the law of petty 
treason was designed to maintain the gender hierarchy within the household and 
particularly targetted the behaviour of married women. Married women accused of petty 
treason had the highest conviction rate of everyone accused o f killing-related offences in 
the eighteenth century. This suggests that authorities were more concerned with 
maintaining patriarchal authority and the gender hierarchy than with maintaining proper 
gender roles. Married women could transgress certain gender boundaries, but courts, 
judges and juries made those married women who transgressed the gender hierarchy into 
extreme examples o f the severity o f the law. The law was meant to uphold the social and
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gender hierarchy, and it had to do so without explicitly portraying it as such. Therefore, 
judges and juries treated those who upset the gender hierarchy particularly harshly.
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C h a p t e r  5: C r im in a l  W iv e s  in  t h e  O l d  B a il e y
The Disorders o f  Marriage proceeding from  the two foregoing Causes, 
viz. The too great Liberty allowed our Women, and the want o f  true 
Love in the young Couple before the indissolvable Knot is tied.
-Philogamus, The Present State o f  Matrimony, 1739
Malcolm Gaskill studied serious crimes to see “how ordinary people . .  .perceived
themselves, their social environment and their universe, and conversely, how these
perceptions both reflected and shaped popular beliefs and behaviour over time.”245
Crime is a useful area of study because it reveals quite sharply what people thought, the
boundaries they set, and how they treated and dealt with those who transgressed these
boundaries. In addition, one can also study particular groups of accused criminals to
reveal attitudes towards larger groups in the social fabric. Married women were a unique
group since theoretically coverture made them into children before the law and enabled
them to occasionally escape criminal liability. Not only did marriage demand obedience,
but the theoretical unity of person meant that married women did not technically exist
before the law. Coverture therefore led to the defence of coercion. As Blackstone
explained: “in some felonies, and other inferior crimes, committed by [a wife], through
constraint of her husband, the law excuses her: but this extends not to treason or
murder.”246 Although even Blackstone’s wording is limited, a great deal o f modem
scholarship has come to accept that married women were not liable for their crimes.247
Accepting the defence of coercion at face value ignores the multiple purposes and
experiences o f  coverture while discounting the actions o f  a portion, albeit a small portion,
of eighteenth-century accused criminals. The study of married women accused of crime
245 Gaskill, M entalities, 3.
246 Blackston, Commentaries I, 432.
247 King, “Female offenders,” 69; Beattie, “Criminality o f  Women,” 87; Shoemaker, Gender in English 
Society, 297; Froide, “Marital Status as a Category,” 260.
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not only reveals the treatment of married women before the courts, but also how 
coverture functioned outside of property law and larger attitudes towards married women 
and individuality throughout the eighteenth century.
Figure 3.1, which charted the accusations against married women for theft-related 
offences, showed a distinctive pattern that rose drastically in the 1740s and continued to 
rise until a sudden drop in the 1780s. Since this pattern differs greatly from the pattern 
for overall accusations for theft-related offences in the eighteenth-century charted in 
figure 3.2, it suggests a change in attitude towards married women during the eighteenth 
century. Although figure 4.1 indicates a drop in prosecutions of married women for 
killing in the 1780s, the pattern of accusations does not match the overall pattern found in 
figure 3.1. This is because the defence of coercion did not apply to married women 
accused of killing. It would be rather shocking to find a similar pattern between theft- 
related offences and killing-related offences. However, since judges, juries and the law 
itself already saw murdering wives as individual people, there is no perceivable change in 
the pattern of accusations as there was in the theft-related offences where married women 
were not considered legal individuals. As previously stated, the pattern in figure 3.1 
reflects the pattern Susan Staves found in her examination o f equity cases. Staves argues 
that separate maintenance contracts recognized two persons within marriage because a 
contract must be between two people, and these contracts recognized separate interests 
within the marriage. She found that from 1675 until 1778, “equity courts were 
increasingly hospitable to the idea o f separate maintenance and contract logic.”249 In 
recognizing separate maintenance contracts, equity courts allowed for the possibility of
248 Staves, M arried W omen’s Separate Property,, 169, 181.
249 Ibid, 175.
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two persons within marriage, which went against the basic premise o f coverture: unity of
person. However, this trend changed in the late eighteenth century. From 1778 to 1780,
A series of cases at both law and equity attempted to reassert the 
‘general principle’ that a husband and wife being in law one person 
cannot contract with each other against what were now said to be 
mistaken exceptions. Much of the criticism centred on what were 
claimed to be the hopeless confusions and illogicalities of allowing 
an anomalous middle state between feme covert and feme sole.250
In much the same way as contracts required two legal entities to be valid, the courts
needed to deal with legal individuals when apportioning blame for criminal acts. As
Dana Rabin explains, “The legal system depended on a true and coherent self that could
be held responsible for its behaviour and misbehaviour.”251 By recognizing married
women as separate from their husbands, the courts’ actions allowed ordinary people to
see married women as liable for their actions, which was not the case in the theory of
coverture. While the courts had been willing to recognize married women as independent
legal entities during most of the eighteenth century, the 1780s saw a reassertion of
traditional values, roles, and married women’s legal status. Both Staves’ examination of
equity courts and my examination of the Old Bailey records indicate that the 1780s saw a
reassertion o f traditional values in regards to coverture.
One can see these patterns in other areas o f eighteenth-century life. During the
Renaissance, there was a need for the “idea of two genders, one subordinate to the other,
to provide a key element in [the] hierarchical view of the social order and to butress [the]
gendered division o f labour.”252 These two categories o f gender were very important
during the gender struggles o f the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Jean Howard
250 Ibid , 178.
251 Rabin, Identity, Crime and Legal Responsibility, 10.
252 Jean E. Howard, “Crossdressing, The Theatre, and Gender Struggle in Early Modem England,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 39:4 (1988), 423.
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explains, “the vast social changes of the period led to intensified pressures on women and
a strengthening of patriarchal authority in the family and the state.”253 However, as the
courts’ treatment of married women shows, characterizations of gender changed in the
eighteenth century. During the early and mid-eighteenth century, Dror Wohrman argues
that English society “was characterized on the part of many (albeit not all) by a resigned
-  if  not humouring -  willingness to accept that gender boundaries could ultimately prove
porous and inadequate; and therefore that individuals were not necessarily always defined
or fixed by those boundaries.”254 Gender was something external, as in masculinity
defined by the wearing of the breeches. To a large extent, people could choose their
gender roles by their actions, and this was not a fixed decision. Women could act as men,
and men could act as women. Moreover, the choice to take on the characteristics o f a
particular gender was reversible. Wahrman further explains that:
although the expectations from ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ were 
generally well defined, contemporaries did not perceive them as 
necessarily determining each and every individual, and could often 
be found to react to apparent subversions of these expectations with 
resignation, or tolerance, or -  not infrequently -  even appreciation.257
During the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, people began to question gender
boundaries and to experiment with different ideas of conformity to gender roles.
Wahrman sees this in representations of Amazons and other women prized for their
“masculinity,” female dress with decidedly masculine cuts, and even in translations o f the
253 Ibid, 427. See also: D.E. Underdown, “The Taming o f  the Scold: the Enforcement o f  Patriarchal 
Authority in Early Modem England,” in Order and D isorder in Early Modern England, ed. Anthony 
Fletcher and John Stevenson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 116; Susan Dwyer 
Amussen, “Gender, Family and the Social Order, 1560-1725,” in Order and D isorder in Early Modern  
England, ed. Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 210, 
217.
254 Wahrman, “Percy's Prologue,” 117.
255 Clark, Struggle fo r  the Breeches, 68.
256 Wahrman, “Percy's Prologue,” 121.
257 Wahrman, “Queen Bees,” 274.
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Roman satirist Juvenal. However, the “gender play” and willingness to experiment 
ended abruptly in the 1780s. Wahrman terms this a “gender panic” that replaced the 
playfulness of the previous decades “with a widespread anxiety about such instabilities of 
gender boundaries and gender categories.”259 Thus, guardians of order and reform sought 
to fix and “refashion the expectations and values of men and women alike.” These 
new expectations and values were actually a return to traditional roles, which included 
the reassertion of unity of person. Despite the experiences of married women in the first 
three-quarters of the century, married women after the 1780s could expect judges and 
juries to treat them as children before the law. It was during the playfulness of the earlier 
period where prosecutors, judges and juries treated many married women as independent 
legal entities. This was obviously a reflection of the prevailing ideology of the time. The 
findings of this thesis reinforce Wahrman and Staves’ argument that the 1780s witnessed 
a large reversal in the treatment of women and the reassertion of fixed gender categories.
Despite a willingness within society to “play with” gender roles, coverture still 
functioned in the eighteenth century. As the cases where the defence o f coercion applied 
illustrate, coverture existed in the Old Bailey despite an increased willingness to see 
married women as independent legal entities. However, coverture was not the rule and 
an increase in prosecutions, brought about by a change in perception of gender, meant 
that more married women faced the prospect of conviction throughout the eighteenth 
century. Elizabeth Handley, who along with her husband stole feathers, pewter plates 
and an iron candlestick from Stephen Rowse, certainly benefited from coverture. In
258 Ibid, 251-253, 259, 261, 271; Wahrman, “Gender in Translation,” 21.
259 Wahrman, “Gender in Translation,” 31.
260 Kathleen Wilson, The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century (London 
and N ew  York: Routledge, 2003), 93.
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1700, a jury acquitted her of theft and convicted her husband, despite believing that 
Elizabeth was guilty of the theft.261 However, Ann Tompion, the pickpocket who stole 
from Elizabeth Cole in 1720 did not receive the benefit of coercion despite the presence 
of her husband during the theft.262 The jury convicted Ann and sentenced her to death 
while acquitting her husband. Neither Ann nor Elizabeth represents the majority of 
married women accused of theft-related offences. Ann was as much an exception to the 
rule o f the defence of coercion as was Elizabeth. Rather, coverture and the defence of 
coercion, much like everything else in the eighteenth-century English law was
• 9discretionary in nature. The decision to apply the defence of coercion rested with 
judges and juries, and their decisions rested on a number of factors.
As P.G. Lawson explains, “it was the need to make the message of the gallows as 
effective as possible which not only gave early modem criminal justice its particular 
character but also shaped the behaviour of its principal decision makers, including the 
jurors.”264 The decision to send an offender to the gallows depended on the nature o f the 
offence, the character of the offender, the status of the offender, and often the perceived 
state o f crime at the time o f the trial. However, for married women, the judge and jurors’ 
chief consideration was the conformity of the offender to prescribed gender roles. The 
defence of coercion excused a married woman o f criminal liability because she 
committed the act under the authority o f her husband not because o f unity o f person. It 
was cases such as Elizabeth Handley’s or Ann Lindsey’s, where the wife acted under her
261 “John Handley, Elizabeth Handley, 15th January, 1700.”
262 “Thomas Tompion, Ann Tompion, 12th October, 1720.”
263 Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law;” Langbein, Adversary Criminal Trial, 6, 231, 336, 
338, 343; Stretton, “Women, Property and Law,” 41; Herrup, The Common Peace.
264 P.G. Lawson, “Lawless Juries? The Composition and Behaviour o f  Hertfordshire Juries, 1573-1624,” in 
Twelve G ood Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800, ed. J.S. Cockbum and 
Thomas A. Green (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 120.
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husband’s direct orders, that resulted in acquittals because of coercion.265 Cases such as 
Frances Emerton’s, who was accused of robbery in 1732, and Sarah Northey’s shoplifting 
case from 1784, where the wife took the initiative resulted in convictions because the 
wife did not conform to her proper submissive role.266 Married women transgressed 
boundaries by independent thought or action, and the defence of coercion did not apply in 
these cases. The defence o f coercion could not excuse murder or other killing-related 
offences, even in theory. By killing someone, married women stepped so far out of their 
prescribed gender roles that the courts had to step in and reassert male authority and the 
authority of the state. The gender “playfulness” of the first three quarters of the 
eighteenth century was still limited. Gender boundaries could be pushed, but they still 
had limits, and criminal behaviour reveals the extreme limit o f such tolerance. When 
criminal wives pushed the boundaries too far, judges and juries ensured that the law 
would remove any potential benefits from the paternalistic doctrine of coverture. If 
women acted as men through violent or independent initiative in criminal acts, the law 
did not feel that the defence of coercion was applicable, and therefore held them liable for 
their actions.
This illustrates Hay’s argument about the law’s central element o f control.267 
However, the need to control order implied more than the social order. Gender control 
was central to the social order and the law sought to maintain the proper gender order by 
stepping in when women transgressed certain boundaries. In 1739, “Philogamus” wrote 
that: “the great Concern of every Commonwealth, is to keep [women] within due
265 “John Handley, Elizabeth Handley, 15lh January, 1700;” “Richard Lindsey, Ann Lindsey, 1st March, 
1721.” With certain exceptions, husbands generally had to be present for juries to assume coercion.
266 “James Emerton and Frances his wife, 5th July, 1732;” “William Northey, Sarah Northey, 26th May, 
1784.”
267 Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law.”
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Bounds.”268 As Wahrman demonstrates, these boundaries were questioned in the 
eighteenth century, but there were still limits. The influence and importance of the 
patriarchal head of household remained throughout the eighteenth century, and women 
were still subordinate.269 There was a recognition of the ability to take on masculine 
roles, but it did not extend to equality between the sexes in the modem sense. Despite an 
increased willingness in the eighteenth century for prosecutors to regard a wife as 
separate from her husband, judges and juries still utilized the defence of coercion. 
Coverture existed in part to control female behaviour by ensuring that a husband’s 
authority could be more powerful than the laws of England. By giving husbands such 
power, and enforcing that power through the occasional defence of coercion, judges and 
juries reinforced the gender hierarchy.
There was no professional police force or standing army in eighteenth-century 
England. The only way that those in authority could maintain the law was through 
private prosecution. However, prosecutors did not largely come from the elite part of 
society, but rather the middle and the lower, excluding the vagrant poor.270 Hay and 
Linebaugh both demonstrate that the elite made and administered the law to serve their 
best interests, but everybody used the law for their own purposes.271 The overwhelming 
social acceptance of the law was its most powerful asset, and served to keep the elite in
268 Philogamus, “The Present State o f  Matrimony: or, the Real Causes o f  Conjugal Infidelity and Unhappy 
Marriages, (1739),” in Women in the Eighteenth Century: Constructions o f  Femininity, ed. Vivien Jones 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 77.
269 John Tosh, “The old Adam and the new man: emerging themes in the history o f  English masculinities, 
1750-1850,” in English Masculinities, 1660-1800, ed. Tim Hitchcock and Michele Cohen (New York: 
Longman, 1999), 225.
270 Langbein, “Fatal Flaws,” 105-108, 120.
271 Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,”; Linebaugh, London Hanged, 74, 79, 83; Hay, 
“Prosecution and Power,” 392-394.
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power without significant protest from below. Michael Braddick and John Walter 
explain that:
the apparent hegemony of values which serve the interests of the 
dominant groups is a product of the need to normalise relations, 
either to compensate for the absence of, or to avoid the political 
costs of, rule by coercion. In making authority appear natural, 
these modes of self-presentation by elite groups serve to 
‘euphemise’ power. 72
The law enjoyed acceptance because it appeared natural, beneficial and equal. Even
execution had to be carefully considered since the execution of certain individuals could
“weaken the legitimacy of the sanction.”273 Although it benefited them, the landed
classes had to work within the law, which further strengthened the legitimacy of the law.
Scott explains that in order for a power system to be effective it “must, in effect ‘make
implicit promises o f benefits for subordinate groups that will serve as the stake which
they too have in the prevailing order,’ and some, at least, of these promises must be
delivered upon ‘if it is to have the slightest hope of gaining compliance.’”274 In the case
of the criminal law, these promises included the protection of property and the equal
treatment o f all before the law. Everyone had property and it was important to him or
her. The chance to prosecute those who stole from an individual was essential to the law.
Examples of elites who broke the law, such as Lord Ferrers, reinforced the notion of
equality before the law. By limiting the law and living within its boundaries, the elites
managed to control social order and maintain their authority without the presence of a
professional police force or standing army.
272 Braddick and Walter, “Introduction,” 5-6.
273 Lawson, “Lawless Juries,” 149.
274 As quoted in: Braddick and Walter, “Introduction,” 6.
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The criminal law also controlled the gender order. The law of petty treason and 
its corresponding punishments reinforced the authority of the husband within marriage 
and as head o f the household. The law of infanticide reinforced strictures against 
premarital sex and sought to control the actions of unmarried women. However, one of 
the main forms of control was coverture. In theory, coverture meant that husband and 
wife were one person before the law. Upon marriage, a woman underwent a civil death, 
and no longer existed as an independent legal person.275 She lost all her property, unless 
a contract was made before the marriage, any property she obtained during marriage 
became her husband’s, she could not sue or be sued without her husband, and she could 
not make contracts for the upkeep of her family or herself without her husband’s 
permission. These property rules made married women into dependants, whose lives and 
well-being depended on the benevolence of their husbands. While coverture was 
supposed to create harmony by combining resources and providing a common purpose
on ftfor the household, daily life often complicated the unity of persons within marriage.
Both husbands and wives were often unaware of the implications of coverture, and many 
lived their lives as if unity of person was nothing at all. However, married women 
accused of theft-related offences in the eighteenth century sometimes had a chance to be 
thankful for coverture and the corresponding defence of coercion.
This lack o f criminal liability was one of the reasons why eighteenth-century 
commentators claimed that women were the favourites of the law. However, this 
assertion contrasts with modem scholarship that claims coverture was a patriarchal tool 
designed to maintain married women’s subordinate position. As this thesis demonstrated,
275 Fowler, “Civil Death,” 768.
276 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, 71, 83-84, 105-108, 193-194; De Grazia, “Afterword,” 300-301; Ingram “Rough 
Music,” 97.
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these two seemingly irreconcilable ideas are actually quite similar. Coercion was an 
example of limited favouritism that actually reinforced the subordinate status of women. 
An ideal woman was obedient, married, submissive and dependant. She did not take 
independent initiative, nor did she disobey her husband’s commands. The ideal woman 
knew, however, that certain commands such as murdering someone, could not be obeyed, 
and she therefore sought to persuade her husband to give up his folly and avoid ill 
behaviour. Theoretical coverture and the defence of coercion were about ideals rather 
than reality. In practice, judges and juries used discretion in their decisions to apply the 
defence of coercion, and their decisions depended on the behaviour of the accused and 
how well it conformed to ideal behaviour. Women who acted outside proper gender roles 
by showing initiative in theft cases, or who displayed violent behaviour in murder cases, 
did not receive the defence of coercion. Women who obeyed their husbands or who 
appeared passive throughout the criminal act and the proceeding case did receive the 
defence of coercion. By providing examples of women who could escape criminal 
liability by passive behaviour, judges and juries reinforced the proper position of women. 
Subordination went hand in hand with the defence of coercion, despite its appearance of 
favouritism. In this sense, both eighteenth-century commentators and modem feminists 
and historians can be found to agree about the nature of coverture.
Marriage did not mean that women stopped committing crimes. As the previous 
chapters illustrate, although only a small percentage of overall accused criminals, married 
women were still accused criminals. These married women were prosecuted, stood 
before the Old Bailey and faced the same punishments as single women, widows, and 
men. The defence of marital coercion was extremely limited, even in theory. To use it as
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justification for an argument that married women were not important as criminals 
misconstrues coverture’s purpose and discounts an important group o f people in criminal 
history. The defence of coercion did not excuse every offence, and judges and juries 
used it sparingly. Rather, the defence of coercion reveals a limited favouritism that 
ultimately reinforced the gender hierarchy. By ensuring that only married women who 
showed dependency and did not transgress the gender boundaries received the defence of 
coercion, judges and juries provided a strong case for obedience. In addition, the 
decision to punish married women who transgressed gender boundaries, demonstrates 
that the paternal nature o f coverture was extremely limited.
In light of these findings about criminal wives, a reassessment of both coverture 
and criminality is necessary. Historians need to allow for female criminals in studies of 
criminality as criminals in their own right instead of pale reflections o f the male norm. 
Garthine Walker and Jenny Kermode accurately point this out, and it remains to be seen 
where the future study of female criminality will lead. Also important is the inclusion of 
criminal wives in this study. Coverture affected more than just married women, and a 
study of criminals’ marital status can lead to a better understanding of how marriage not 
ju s t coverture affected the treatment of male and female offenders in the courts.
Stemming from this work is an inquiry into what happened to the families and 
dependants of the executed or transported. Since juries weighed the potential fallout on 
the dependants, it is important to study more than just jury behaviour. By recognizing 
married women as independent persons and not relying on coercion to explain their fewer 
numbers in the criminal record, historians can better understand the treatment of married 
women and the corresponding complicated common law doctrine of coverture.
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